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– ABSTRACT – 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s Australian foreign policy was focused on ensuring the 
presence of the United States in South East Asia and the consequent protection of 
Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. For the Australian Labor Party between 1960 and 
1967 the fundamental test of its readiness for government was the positions it took on 
issues relating to the Alliance. This thesis sheds light on the ALP’s vision for the 
Alliance during the period.  
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Support for the American Alliance, formalised by the ANZUS treaty, became a 
loyalty test; loyalty to the US became the test of loyalty to Australia itself, as for 
many previous generations loyalty to Britain and the British Empire had been.          
All important issues were debated through the focus of communism (which 
meant in practice Chinese communism) and the US as Australia’s protector 
against the threat. The focus was doubly distorted, the preoccupation with 
communism obscured the truth that almost all the problems with which 
Australia, as well as the US and Britain had to deal, particularly in our region, 
were not the fruit of communism but the legacy of colonialism. 
Gough Whitlam1 
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- INTRODUCTION - 
“A TEST OF LOYALTY”: 
A History of the Australian Labor Party and the United States Alliance 
1960 – 1967 
In November 2011 President Barack Obama addressed a joint sitting of the Federal 
Parliament of Australia. Speaking in the chamber of Australia’s lower house, he 
outlined his vision for the United States - Australian Alliance (hereafter the Alliance) 
in the twenty first century. In doing so, he drew on a set of powerful and symbolic 
events that have reinforced Australia’s partnership with what Robert Menzies 
famously referred to as Australia’s ‘great and powerful friend’ across the past seventy 
years.1 Obama’s rollcall of shared sacrifice in the theatres of the Asia Pacific – from 
the ‘bombing of Darwin’, and the ‘liberation of the Pacific Islands’, to the ‘rice 
paddies of South East Asia’ – traversed well-worn terrain in the public memory of the 
Alliance’s fraternity.2 It was a familiar story that drew not only on the shared 
sacrifices in war, but also promoted ‘core principles’ in which ‘the rights and 
responsibilities of all nations and all people are upheld.’3 The President’s invocation 
of freedoms ‘for all people’ – despite its grounding in the contemporary realities of 
the Asia Pacific – echoed similar entreaties of President Lyndon Johnson, who had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  A.W. Martin, Menzies, Sir Robert Gordon (Bob) (1894 – 1978), (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 15, 2000), Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian 
National University < http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/menzies-sir-robert-gordon-bob-
11111/text19783>, viewed 4 February 2012.  
2	  Barack	  Obama,	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia	  Parliamentary	  Debates	  House	  of	  Representatives	  
Official	  Hansard	  [hereafter	  CPD,	  H.	  of	  R.],	  17	  Nov	  2011,	  (Canberra: Commonwealth Government 
Printer, 2011)	  p.	  12847.	  
3	  Ibid,	  p.	  12848.	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addressed a Parliamentary luncheon some forty five years prior to Obama’s speech. In 
his remarks to the luncheon gathering, Johnson grounded America’s determination to 
‘build a world in which both peace and freedom can flourish’ in the context of the 
‘Aussie who stands there in the rice paddies’.4 By unifying the symbolic with the 
reality of military action, past and present, President Johnson gave voice to the 
American view of the Alliance: one forged in war, bound together by cultural 
synergies and supported by a growing economic relationship. It is a view, from the 
height of the Cold War to the ongoing twenty first century ‘war on terror’ in the 
Middle East that has been continually reinforced by Australia’s enthusiastic 
invocation of the Alliance’s traditions and historical totems.  
In welcoming President Obama to Australia for the first time, Prime Minister Julia 
Gillard also drew on a familiar rhetorical toolkit. She spoke in glowing terms of an 
Alliance that ‘since its founding in 1951’ had ‘always been more’.5 It was a 
‘friendship dedicated to the values we share in the life of the world’.6 Like Presidents 
Obama and Johnson, Prime Minister Gillard anchored her concept of the Alliance in a 
shared history. Australia’s successful negotiation of the ANZUS treaty was the 
culmination of ‘the judgments of an Australian Labor Prime Minister and the resolve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Lyndon	  Baines	  Johnson,	  542-­	  Remarks	  at	  the	  Parliamentary	  Luncheon,	  (Canberra:	  October	  21,	  1966)	  created	  1999,	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project	  –	  a	  collaboration	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California	  Santa	  Barbara,	  USA,	  <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27951>,	  viewed	  1	  April,	  2012.	  5	  Julia	  Gillard,	  CPD,	  H.	  of	  R.,	  17	  November	  2011,	  (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 
2011),	  p.	  12843.	  
6	  Ibid.	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of an American President a decade earlier’ during the Pacific War.7 Her homage to 
the Labor Prime Minister, John Curtin was not in and of itself a novel act. Indeed, it 
clung closely to an existing Australian Labor Party (hereafter ALP or Labor) tradition 
of sustaining contemporary political objectives through the utilisation of powerful, 
historically anchored, mythologies.8 Yet, there is a divergence between the two 
conceptions of the Alliance. It is a difference of worldviews, one that invokes 
different histories and canonises contrasting events to frame the contemporary 
relationship. In both Obama and Johnson’s formulation of the Alliance, the war in 
Vietnam and the clash of ideology during the Cold War were at the core of their 
conceptions of the formal and informal relationship. Contrastingly, the ALP has 
elevated the Second World War as the baptismal font for the Alliance, rendering the 
historical terrain of the Cold War period more problematic.  
The Labor Party’s vision of the Alliance between 1960 and 1967 under the Leader 
of the Federal Opposition Arthur Calwell has largely been overlooked, not only in the 
way the ALP recounts its history of the Alliance, but more broadly in the political and 
diplomatic histories of Australia’s relationship with the US. This thesis attempts to 
shed light on this omission by exploring the Labor Party’s approach to and vision for 
the Alliance at the height of the Cold War. Labor’s path through the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  Julia	  Gillard	  speech,	  see	  Ibid.	  Representatives	  of	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  United	  States	  signed	  the	  ANZUS	  Treaty	  in	  San	  Francisco	  on	  1	  September	  1951.	  The	  crucial	  operative	  clause	  was	  Article	  IV:	  ‘Each	  Party	  recognises	  that	  an	  armed	  attack	  in	  the	  Pacific	  area	  on	  any	  of	  the	  Parties	  would	  be	  dangerous	  to	  its	  own	  peace	  and	  safety	  and	  declares	  that	  it	  would	  act	  to	  meet	  the	  common	  danger	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  constitutional	  processes.’	  For	  further	  reading	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  ANZUS	  see	  W.	  David	  McIntyre,	  Background	  to	  ANZUS	  Pact:	  Policymaking,	  Strategy	  and	  
Diplomacy,	  1945	  –	  1955	  (New	  York,	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1995).	  	  8	  The	  nomenclature	  for	  this	  thesis	  refers	  alternately	  to	  the	  Labor	  Party,	  the	  ALP,	  the	  Party	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  leadership.	  They	  all	  refer	  to	  the	  Federal	  Parliamentary	  Labor	  Party	  (FPLP).	  If	  broader	  reference	  is	  made	  to	  the	  extra-­‐parliamentary	  party,	  including	  Executive	  officeholders,	  or	  members	  of	  the	  broader	  Labour	  movement,	  then	  the	  relevant	  terminology	  has	  been	  used.	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minefield created by the foreign policy challenges of this period deserves new 
consideration.  
  
An Alliance for a changing world 
Labor’s approach to the Alliance between 1960 and 1967 was deeply grounded in 
a long held Australian desire to draw the United States into Australia’s security 
arrangements.9 With this in mind, the increasing intimacy between Washington and 
Canberra in the post-war era is better understood by briefly revisiting the continuities 
in Australian foreign policy between federation and the period under investigation.  
The peace of the post-World War II years had done nothing to alter the anxiety of 
geographic vulnerability that Australian Governments of all political persuasions had 
held since federation. For Herbert Vere Evatt  (Labor’s External Affairs Minister in 
both the Curtin and Chifley Governments and the Leader of the Parliamentary Party 
between 1951 and 1960) the declaration by Prime Minister Billy Hughes at London’s 
Savoy in 1921 that ‘out of the Pacific comes for us life or death’ held just as true in 
the decade following 1945.10 Evatt’s enthusiastic attempt to create a security pact with 
Washington bore testimony not only to his appraisal of the new global order, but also 
to a long standing assessment by Australian foreign policy makers of the need to 
secure the United States as a guarantor of Australian security, a point which the 
realities of World War II had underlined. 11 Indeed, the progenitors of Evatt’s failed 
attempts and the eventual success of the ANZUS treaty dated back to Pacific pact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  David	  McLean,	  ‘From	  British	  Colony	  to	  American	  Satellite?	  Australia	  and	  the	  USA	  during	  the	  Cold	  War’,	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  and	  History,	  52,	  no.	  1	  (2006),	  p.	  68.	  	  10	  “Billy	  Hughes	  in	  London”,	  The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  15	  August	  1921,	  p.1.	  11	  David	  Goldsworthy,	  Losing	  the	  Blanket:	  Australia	  And	  The	  End	  of	  Britain’s	  Empire	  (Melbourne,	  MUP,	  2002),	  p.	  16;	  Neville	  Meaney,	  ‘Britishness	  and	  Australian	  Identity:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Nationalism	  in	  Australian	  History	  and	  Historiography’,	  Australian	  Historical	  Studies,	  32,	  116	  (April	  2001),	  p.	  87.	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proposals of Prime Ministers Alfred Deakin in 1909 and Joseph Lyons in 1937.12 
Although Evatt had vigorously pursued a security pact with the United States, 
Australia had to wait until 1951, when the evolution of the Cold War shaped 
Washington’s resolve to develop a NATO style security arrangement in the South 
Pacific. The transformation in US thinking provided the Coalition Government and 
Minister for External Affairs Sir Percy Spender with the capacity to establish the 
ANZUS Treaty as the formal basis for a long held national ambition.13 Critically, this 
mirrored broader geopolitical transformations.  
On 5 March 1946 when Winston Churchill declared that an ‘Iron Curtain’ had 
‘descended’ across the European continent, the opening act of the Cold War, the 
tensions between the former Allied powers were still being played out on the 
European continent.14 By the fall of the Chifley Government in December 1949, the 
Chinese Communist Party was in power in Peking.15 Moreover, the increasing 
economic stability of the post-war European settlement would shift the theatre of the 
Cold War’s second act to the tumultuous and fast evolving Asia Pacific region. Eric 
Hobsbawm notes that after 1945, the ‘future orientation of the new post-colonial 
states was by no means clear’. The advent of substantial decolonisation in Asia 
created a ‘zone in which the two superpowers continued, throughout the Cold War, to 
compete for support and influence’. 16  Consequently, Asia became ‘the major zone of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  McLean,	  ‘From	  British	  Colony	  to	  American	  Satellite?’,	  p.	  68.	  13	  Ibid,	  pp.	  13	  –	  32.	  	  14	  Tony	  Judt,	  Postwar:	  A	  History	  of	  Europe	  Since	  1945	  (London:	  Vintage,	  2010),	  p.	  110;	  see	  also	  Winston	  Churchill,	  The	  Iron	  Curtain	  (Fulton,	  Missouri:	  5	  March	  1946)	  contained	  in,	  The	  Penguin	  
Book	  of	  Twentieth	  Century	  Speeches	  (London:	  Penguin,	  3,	  1999),	  p.	  232.	  	   
15	  Eric	  Hobsbawm,	  The	  Age	  of	  Extremes	  (London:	  Abacus,	  2004),	  p.	  227.	  
16	  Ibid.	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friction’ between Washington, Moscow and Peking.17 The stage had been set. Asia 
was to be the new frontier of friction between two competing super powers. Neither 
America, nor the Communist bloc could be assured of influence in a rapidly changing 
global order.  
Consequently, the establishment of ANZUS must be seen in the light of the 
correlating transformation in Washington’s East Asian policy between 1949 and 
1950.18 The Truman doctrine in 1947 advanced the theory that Communism was 
monolithic, insidious and required an aggressive and universal response to combat its 
influence.19 Yet, between 1947 and 1950, America balanced rhetorical condemnation 
of Soviet influence with reduced aid for the Nationalist regime in China and a 
cautious approach to any military involvement in South East Asia.20 But between 
1949 and 1950 the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the 
development of an atomic weapon by the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the 
Korean War forced the United States into a reassessment of its East Asian strategy.21 
As McLean notes, by the northern spring of 1950, Formosa, Indochina and the 
stability of the East Asia ‘came to enjoy new levels of American commitment’.22 This 
commitment remained steadfast in Washington’s appraisal of the Cold War through to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Ibid.	  	  18	  	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  the	  transformation	  in	  Washington’s	  East	  Asian	  policy	  affected	  the	  ANZUS	  negotiations,	  see	  David	  McLean,	  ‘ANZUS	  Origins:	  A	  Reassessment’,	  Australian	  Historical	  
Studies,	  24,	  94	  (April,	  1990),	  pp.	  66	  –	  67.	  	  
19	  John	  L.	  Gaddis,	  The	  Long	  Peace:	  Inquiries	  Into	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (New	  York,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  pp.	  56	  –	  7.	  20	  McLean,	  ‘ANZUS	  Origins:	  A	  Reassessment’,	  pp.	  66	  –	  67.	  	  	  21	  Ibid.	  	  22	  Ibid,	  p.	  66.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  7	  	  
the Guam Doctrine of 1969.23 Not only was this the fundamental readjustment that led 
to the creation of ANZUS, but it was also the foundation of America’s willingness to 
accommodate Australia’s interests in the pursuit of its own goals within the region.  
Though the establishment of ANZUS essentially had bipartisan support, it 
occurred against a background of changing circumstances for Australia.24 The 
diminution of the United Kingdom’s status as a Great Power, and Australia’s 
protector, required the Government of the day to pursue arrangements for the 
protection of Australian interests by the United States.25 In addition, the rapidly 
changing political landscape of the Asia Pacific between 1949 and 1950 prompted a 
sharp appraisal of Australia’s immediate defence priorities. Moreover, this appraisal 
of Australia’s security requirements altered the underlying cultural assumptions that 
informed Australian foreign policy. While the racial overtones of the White Australia 
policy remained into the 1960s, the slow decay of British race patriotism and the 
fervent anti-Communism of the post-war years lent itself to an increasing alignment 
between Australian and American assessments of the world during the Cold War.26  
Political unanimity existed on ANZUS as the cornerstone of Australia’s defence 
arrangements. Yet, it is important to note that the ALP in particular was disposed to 
approaching issues of external relations through the prism of liberal internationalism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  Guam	  Doctrine	  was	  announced	  by	  US	  President	  Nixon	  in	  a	  press	  conference	  on	  25	  July	  1969	  see	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon,	  279	  –	  Informal	  Remarks	  in	  Guam	  with	  Newsmen,	  (Guam:	  25	  July	  1969)	  created	  1999,	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project	  –	  a	  collaboration	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California	  Santa	  Barbara,	  USA,	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140>,	  viewed	  5	  September,	  2012.	  
24	  Evatt	  had	  wanted	  Britain	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  ANZUS	  Pact	  see	  Arthur	  Calwell,	  CPD,	  H.	  of	  R.,	  21	  April	  1964	  (Canberra:	  Commonwealth	  Government	  Printer,	  1964),	  p.	  1274.	  	  	  	  25	  Glen	  St	  Barclay,	  Friends	  in	  High	  Places:	  Australian-­American	  diplomatic	  relations	  since	  1945	  (Melbourne:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  pp.	  1-­‐13.	  	  
26	  McLean,	  ‘From	  British	  Colony	  to	  American	  Satellite?’,	  pp.	  67	  –	  68.	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The party’s recognition of Australia’s status as a small to middle power, 
geographically isolated in an evolving Asian region, created two discernible traditions 
in Australian foreign policy. Evatt, who had been intimately involved in the formation 
of the United Nations in 1945, saw the body as heralding a new world order ‘on 
which must rest…the hopes of men of goodwill throughout the world’.27 This view of 
both the United Nations and the principles underpinning it was remarkably resilient in 
the context of increasing Cold War animosity. The commitment to the principles of 
liberal internationalism existed in Opposition as a preference towards international 
dispute resolution through the United Nations or the creation of new multilateral 
frameworks. This was reflected consistently by Labor’s calls to refer the French 
Indochina dispute to the United Nations, the Indonesian claim to West Papua, and the 
proposal during the 1960s for a Southern Hemisphere nuclear free zone.28  
Contrastingly, the Coalition parties’ philosophical perspective could be more aptly 
categorised as realist.29 This led to the assessment of the issues facing Australia 
increasingly being defined through the prism of the balance of power engendered by 
the Cold War. Though there were discontinuities in this approach, the overall 
condition of Government policy was shaped by an increasing alignment with America 
and a commensurate contraction of Canberra’s willingness to demur from 
Washington’s view. For the ALP, the divergence of approaches to foreign policy did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  H.V.	  Evatt,	  CPD,	  H.	  of	  R.,	  13	  March	  1946	  (Canberra:	  Commonwealth	  Government	  Printer,	  1946),	  p.	  192.	  	  28	  For	  the	  ALP	  suggestion	  that	  the	  Indochina	  dispute	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  see	  E.G.	  Whitlam,	  CPD,	  H.	  of	  R.,	  15	  September	  1953	  (Canberra:	  Commonwealth	  Government	  Printer,	  1953),	  p.	  211;	  on	  West	  Papua	  see:	  A.L.	  Burns	  ‘Problems	  of	  Australian	  Foreign	  Policy	  January	  –	  June	  1961’,	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  and	  History,	  7,	  no.	  2	  (November	  1961),	  p.	  156;	  on	  Southern	  Hemisphere	  Nuclear	  Free	  Zone	  see:	  Resolution of Federal Executive on Disarmament and 
Nuclear Tests, 4 July 1962, Arthur Calwell Papers, Folder 1224, Box 270, MS4738, NLA.  
29	  The	  Coalition	  parties	  comprised	  of	  the	  Australian	  Liberal	  Party	  and	  the	  Australian	  Country	  Party.	  Though	  two	  separate	  political	  entities,	  they	  united	  to	  form	  the	  Government	  between	  1949	  and	  1972.
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not dim its attachment to the Alliance as the core of Australia’s security relationship. 
Their view was always pragmatism tinged with idealism. The problem, in an 
increasingly unstable region was how to oppose US policy, without opposing the 
Alliance itself; especially when there was a genuine belief that Australia’s interests 
were not in alignment with those of Washington.  
Labor in the 1960s 
In 1960, Evatt was persuaded to retire as Leader of the Opposition.30 In his place, 
the caucus elected the, Melbourne Catholic and former Deputy Leader, Arthur 
Augustus Calwell.31 Calwell was both an avid amateur historian, with a particular 
interest in American revolutionary and civil war history and a paternal descendant of 
an American who had migrated to Victoria during the Gold Rush.32 He was 
unexpectedly replaced as Deputy by the forty three year old Sydney barrister Edward 
Gough Whitlam.33 Calwell’s election as Leader came during a tumultuous time for the 
Australian Labour movement. Rent asunder by the ideological split of 1955, the ALP 
had by that stage been out of Federal Government for 11 years.34 Having lost office in 
1949, they would have to wait until 1972 before they again had control of the nation’s 
foreign policy.35 Calwell’s leadership traversed an evolution in the firmament of the 
Alliance; a period that coincided with extensive foreign policy challenges, invited or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Graham	  Freudenberg,	  Calwell,	  Arthur	  Augustus	  (1896	  –	  1973),	  (Melbourne:	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  1993), Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, 
Australian National University <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/calwell-arthur-augustus-9667>, 
viewed 2 February 2012. 
31	  Ibid.  
32	  Ibid.	  	  33	  Ibid.   
34	  Ross	  McMullin,	  The	  Light	  on	  the	  Hill	  the	  Australian	  Labor	  Party	  1891-­1991(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  p.	  279.	  	  
35	  E.G.	  Whitlam,	  The	  Whitlam	  Government	  1972-­1975	  (Melbourne:	  Penguin,	  1985),	  p.	  1.	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unexpected, for Australia. It is possible to trace the decline in Calwell’s electability 
along the contours of Australia’s foreign policy ventures during the 1960s.  
When Calwell ascended to the parliamentary leadership of the ALP, the 
implications of a Cold War focused on Asia were evident.36 American intervention in 
Vietnam in 1954 gradually escalated until 1965 when open conflict, including the 
commitment of Australian troops led to the second hot war of the Cold War.37 In 
addition, Indonesian claims to West Papua had led to the incorporation of the territory 
by Indonesia following mediation between the Netherlands (the departing colonial 
power) and the United States. It was against this backdrop of rapidly evolving and 
complex regional events that the development of the Alliance with the Coalition 
Government grew to a state of unprecedented intimacy. 
Furthermore, with the Government unlikely to depart from a traditional conception 
of Australia’s status as a ‘white nation’ in the Pacific, and embrace the otherness of 
Asia, there was little alternative to increasingly seeking security through the 
development of a closer Alliance. Moreover, the urgency of the situation had been 
underlined by Britain’s obvious reluctance to remain as a power in the Asia Pacific; a 
direction which first became apparent with Britain’s decision to seek membership of 
the European Economic Community. 38 The eventual departure of Britain, which 
announced its decision in 1965 to withdraw ‘East of Suez’, altered Australia’s sense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  McLean,	  ‘From	  British	  Colony	  to	  American	  Satellite?’,	  pp.	  76	  –	  77.	  	  
37	  For	  1965	  Australian	  troop	  commitment	  to	  Vietnam	  see	  Paul	  Ham,	  Vietnam:	  The	  Australian	  War	  (Sydney:	  Harper	  Collins,	  2007),	  pp.	  118-­‐31;	  P.G.	  Edwards	  &	  Gregory	  Pemberton,	  Crises	  and	  
Commitments:	  The	  Politics	  and	  Diplomacy	  of	  Australia’s	  Involvement	  in	  Southeast	  Asian	  Conflicts,	  
1948-­1965	  (Sydney:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1992),	  pp.	  351-­‐75;	  Graham	  Freudenberg,	  A	  Certain	  Grandeur	  (Melbourne:	  Sun	  Books,	  1977),	  pp.	  46-­‐54.	  	  
38	  Although	  Britain	  announced	  its	  intention	  to	  join	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  in	  1961,	  it	  was	  not	  formally	  admitted	  until	  1973,	  see	  Stuart	  Ward,	  Australia	  and	  the	  British	  Embrace:	  The	  
Demise	  of	  the	  British	  Ideal	  (Melbourne:	  MUP,	  2001),	  pp.	  247	  –	  48.	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of regional security; a concern that was starkly illustrated by Indonesia’s 
Confrontation of the new Malaysian Federation between 1963 and 1965.39 The 
Government’s appraisal of this new state of affairs qualified its assertiveness in 
seeking greater integration with Washington and particularly with US global defence 
strategy.  
The decision to allow the United States to build a communications station at North 
West Cape in 1962 and its ratification by parliament in 1963 reflected the 
Government’s determination to place the Alliance at the centre of Australian foreign 
policy.40 Though the Government evidently desired greater integration with America 
militarily, it also sent a clear signal that Australia was prepared to pay a high 
premium, including the sacrifice of sovereignty, for a more intimate Alliance 
relationship.41 
Labor provided conditional support for the establishment of the base, but because 
of its opposition to the relinquishment of Australian territorial and military 
sovereignty, was accused by the Government of being anti-American.42 Yet, its 
ambivalence was not towards the United States, but towards the kind of Alliance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Britain	  did	  not	  withdraw	  its	  strategic	  reserves	  from	  the	  far	  east	  until	  1971,	  though	  it	  had	  been	  mooted	  in	  1965,	  the	  policy	  was	  publicly	  formalised	  by	  the	  1967	  Defence	  Whitepaper.	  For	  Britain’s	  retreat	  from	  empire,	  see	  James	  Curran	  &	  Stuart	  Ward,	  The	  Unknown	  Nation	  Australia	  
After	  Empire	  (Melbourne:	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  p.	  45;	  David	  Goldsworthy,	  Losing	  
the	  Blanket:	  Australia	  and	  Britain’s	  Retreat	  from	  Empire	  (Melbourne,	  MUP,	  2002); John Darwin, 
Britain and Decolonisation: The retreat from empire in the post-war world (London: Macmillan, 
1988). For	  Confrontation	  see	  John	  Subritzky,	  Confronting	  Sukarno:	  British,	  American,	  Australian	  
and	  New	  Zealand	  Diplomacy	  in	  the	  Malaysian-­Indonesian	  Confrontation,	  1961-­5	  (London:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2000);	  Edwards,	  Crises	  and	  Commitments,	  pp.	  253	  –	  56;	  T.B.	  Millar,	  Australia’s	  Foreign	  
Policy	  (Sydney:	  Angus	  &	  Robertson,	  1968),	  pp.	  44	  –	  73.	   
40	  Graham	  Freudenberg,	  a	  figure	  of	  speech	  (Brisbane:	  Wiley,	  2005),	  pp.	  49	  –	  53.	  	  
41	  Garfield	  Barwick,	  AMEMBASSY	  Canberra	  to	  Garfield	  Barwick	  (7	  May	  1963),	  quoted	  in	  St	  Barclay,	  Friends	  in	  High	  Places,	  p.	  129.	  	  
42	  Harold	  Holt,	  CPD,	  H.	  of	  R.,	  10	  March	  1964	  (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1964), 
p. 409. 
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relationship the Government was creating. Labor was opposed to a relationship in 
which the junior partner, Australia, was willing to diminish the rights of an 
independent sovereign nation in order to enhance the American commitment to 
Australian security. While this charge was particular to the issue of North West Cape, 
it was not unprecedented in Labor’s response to foreign affairs. Throughout the 
1920s, the visceral hangover of the 1916 – 17 conscription debates was used to 
impugn Labor’s ‘loyalty’ to Britain and its commitment to the post-war imperial 
defence scheme.43 During the late 1930s, under the leadership of John Curtin, Labor 
had to develop an alternate foreign policy that met the strategic imperative of a 
rapidly changing international environment.44 In an echo of the later events of 1963, 
Labor’s earlier trials exhibited the conviction that Australia must at all times be the 
decider of its involvement in affairs directly affecting the national interest.  
Historiographical Traditions and the Alliance 
The intention of this thesis is to investigate Labor’s vision for the Alliance between 
1960 and 1967. Furthermore, this thesis aims to provide a broader contribution to the 
scholarly understanding of the Alliance during the Cold War. By shedding light on 
the way in which Labor understood the Alliance, this thesis cuts against the 
conventional wisdom which holds that this era was one of unprecedented domestic 
consensus on the Alliance and the commensurate support for US foreign policy. 
By refocusing analysis on the Opposition’s vision for the Alliance during the 
1960s this thesis has the capacity to illuminate an overlooked dimension of Australian 
foreign policy during the period. Admittedly, there are some lone voices discussing, 
in at least cursory detail, the response of the Labor Party to the foreign policy of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  See	  for	  example	  James	  Curran,	  Curtin’s	  Empire	  (Melbourne:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  p.	  29;	  D.W.	  Rawson,	  Labor	  in	  Vain?	  (Melbourne:	  Longmans,	  1966),	  p.	  38.	  44	  Ibid,	  pp.	  94	  –	  100.	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1960s. But it is almost universally a secondary corollary to an analysis of the ideas 
and actions of the conservative Governments in power between 1949 and 1972.45 This 
is not unusual. Conservative hegemony had been well established through the 
political mastery of the Menzies years and the Governments he led continued to hold 
sway after his retirement. Labor was in disarray, both electorally and internally. Yet, 
despite the party’s electoral incapacity, treatments of the Coalition Governments’ 
conduct in external affairs do not explore in satisfactory depth the connection between 
domestic politics and the creation of Australian foreign policy during the period.  
There are three schools of thought within the historiographical tradition of the 
Alliance. The first perspective reflects the influence of the ‘radical nationalist’ strand 
of Australian historiography.46 In this rendering of Australia’s foreign policy the 
Labor administration of Curtin, and Chifley had forged a distinctive, sovereign and 
independent foreign policy in the tumult of the Second World War and the years 
immediately following it. The Labor Party is cast as the party of virulent Australian 
nationalism. It is a nationalism that is thwarted by the ascension and dominance of the 
conservative Governments that held office for over two decades.  
In place of this assertive nationalism, the conservative Governments’ foreign 
policy actively and enthusiastically replaced the absent protection of the United 
Kingdom with that of the United States. As Humphrey McQueen has forcefully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45McMullin,	  The	  Light	  on	  the	  Hill,	  p.	  338.	  	  
46	  Works	  typical	  of	  the	  radical	  nationalist	  school	  include Stephen Alomes, A Nation at Last? The 
Changing Character of Australian Nationalism (Sydney, 1988); Philip Bell & Roger Bell, Implicated: 
The United States in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993); L.G.	  Churchward,	  
Australia	  and	  America	  1788-­1972:	  An	  Alternative	  History	  (Sydney:	  Alternative	  Publisher	  Cooperative,	  1979);	  Noel McLachlan, Waiting for the Revolution: A History of Australian 
Nationalism (Melbourne: Ringwood, 1989); Humphrey	  McQueen,	  Gallipolli	  to	  Petrov:	  Arguing	  with	  
Australian	  History	  (Sydney:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1984).	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argued, Australia ‘switched from British sycophant to American lickspittle’.47 In a 
similar vein, L.G. Churchward has argued that the equality and independence exuded 
by the Chifley Labor Government was transformed under Menzies to the point where 
Australia became an ‘American satellite’.48 McLean has noted that the radical 
nationalist interpretation has ‘exerted a profound influence’, and further that it still 
‘pervades much of the scholarly literature’.49 However, the narrative of thwarted 
nationalism places too great an emphasis on the Curtin and Chifley Labor 
Governments as a watershed in Labor’s departure from the desire to attain protection 
in the form of American and British security. 50 They had actively sought after the 
war, and throughout the 1960s continued to rely upon, the protection afforded by 
treaty arrangements with Washington. Therefore, the claim that Australia’s nascent 
independent assertiveness gave way to a subordinating national status constrained by 
the Alliance throughout the 1950s and 1960s overlooks the basic fact that both sides 
of politics viewed the Alliance as essential to the conduct of Australia’s foreign 
policy.51 In part, the radical nationalist school of thought is a product of its time. 
Conditioned by the Cold War, the scholarship of the period exhibited the broadly 
drawn divisions of public opinion on the matter of the Alliance, and the related vision 
for Australia and her place in the world.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  McQueen,	  Gallipolli	  to	  Petrov,	  p.	  174.	  	  
48	  Churchward,	  Australia	  and	  America,	  p.	  165.	  	  
49	  McLean,	  ‘From	  British	  Colony	  to	  American	  Satellite’,	  p.	  	  66.	  50	  St	  Barclay,	  Friends	  in	  High	  Places,	  pp.	  1	  –	  13.	  	  
51	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  Australia’s	  desire	  for	  great	  power	  alliances	  see	  James	  Curran,	  Curtin’s	  
Empire	  (Melbourne:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011);	  McLean,	  ‘From	  British	  Colony	  to	  American	  Satellite’;	  David	  McLean,	  ‘Australia	  in	  the	  Cold	  War:	  A	  Historiographical	  Review’,	  The	  
International	  History	  Review,	  23,	  2	  (June	  2001),	  pp.	  299	  –	  321.	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This conditioning is equally visible in the other discernible tradition of Alliance 
historiography. The alternate conception of the Alliance is one in which Australia had 
to pay an insurance premium for the assurance of American aid in the event of a 
defence requirement.52 The examples of Norman Harper and T.B. Millar in particular 
demonstrate the tendency of this interpretation to remain in orbit of the officially held 
Government position. Harper wrote in the 1980s, on the opposite side of the Cold 
War cultural divide to the radical nationalists, after the emergence of archival material 
that made scholarly re-evaluation possible.53 He concluded in relation to the Vietnam 
insurance premium paid on the Alliance, that it was ‘important for Australia to stand 
up and be counted’.54 Millar, perhaps reluctantly, acknowledged the cost to Australia, 
stating that, ‘Australia has contributed more to ANZUS than she received from it’.55 
However, he also asserted that Australia had received an ‘intangible benefit’ from the 
Alliance, which provided a ‘sense of assurance of help in future danger’.56 Millar and 
Harper typify a particular vision of the Alliance, one that like its radical nationalist 
counterpart has had a remarkable longevity in popular and scholarly conceptions of 
the Alliance.  
Though currently less prominent than either the radical nationalist or orthodox 
schools of Alliance historiography, the persuasive work of Neville Meaney and David 
McLean is increasingly plotting a revisionist course in scholarly conceptions of the 
Australia and America’s relationship between federation and the 1970s. Meaney 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  McLean,	  ‘Australia	  in	  the	  Cold	  War’,	  p.	  302.	  	  
53	  Ibid,	  p.	  304.	  	  	  54	  Norman	  Harper,	  A	  Great	  and	  Powerful	  Friend:	  A	  Study	  of	  Australian	  American	  Relations	  between	  
1900	  and	  1975	  (St	  Lucia:	  QUP,	  1987),	  p.	  324.	  	  
55	  T.B.	  Millar,	  Australia	  in	  Peace	  and	  War:	  External	  Relations,	  1788-­1977	  (Canberra,	  Australian	  National	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  pp.	  221	  –	  2.	  	  
56	  Ibid.	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primarily focuses on the idea of a ‘community of interest’ and its conflict with a 
‘community of culture’ to explain the bipartisan search for collective security 
arrangements with the United States and the increasing intimacy of the Alliance 
during the 1950s and 1960s.57 In Meaney’s conception, the culture of interest was 
derived from Australia’s practical assessment of its remoteness from Britain and the 
consequent conflict that this realisation generated.58 Furthermore, Meaney argues that 
the underlying nationalist construct of British race patriotism or the ‘community of 
culture’ was often diminished when Australian policymakers thought it did not serve 
the national interest.59 McLean, though largely within the orbit of Meaney’s two 
constructs, has advanced the idea that interest rather than sentiment shaped Australian 
desires for American protection.60 He notes that the increasing intimacy of the 
Alliance, rather than reflecting a satellite status or a contraction of action, reflects the 
determination of Australian policymakers to use the American Alliance to further the 
protection of the national interest, which was crucially derived from Australian rather 
than American assessments.61 That this appeared to contract Australian freedom of 
action, he argues, is largely because the Governments of the period formulated 
foreign policy on the basis of a ‘flawed understanding of the limitations of the US 
alliance as a vehicle for Australian interests’.62 Meaney and McLean’s approach 
offers a far more balanced analysis of the impulses that informed Australia’s thinking 
on the Alliance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  See	  in	  particular	  Meaney,	  ‘Britishness	  and	  Australian	  Identity’,	  pp.	  76	  –	  90;	  Neville	  Meaney,	  ‘The	  United	  States’,	  in	  W.J.	  Hudson,	  eds.,	  Australia	  In	  World	  Affairs	  1971	  –	  75	  (Sydney:	  George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1980),	  pp.	  163	  –	  209.	  	  
58	  ‘Meaney,	  ‘Britishness	  and	  Australian	  Identity’,	  p.	  87.	  59	  Ibid.	  	  	  60	  McLean,	  ‘Australia	  in	  the	  Cold	  War’,	  pp.	  299	  –	  321.	  	  61	  Ibid,	  p.	  64.	  62	  Ibid.	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Interestingly, there is also an existing and rich vein of historiography occupied 
with discerning a ‘Labor tradition’ in Australian foreign policy which is characterised 
by a commitment to liberal internationalist principles, primarily through an 
engagement with multilateralism and advocacy for economic and institutional 
development. Proponents of this history, such as Gareth Evans, David Lee and 
Christopher Waters, have relied heavily on comparing the continuities between the 
Labor Governments of the 1940s and the Whitlam, Hawke and Keating 
Governments.63 These contributions are valuable in illustrating some of the principles 
that shaped Labor’s approach to foreign relations in the 1960s. However, absent from 
their conceptions of a ‘Labor tradition’ is the primacy of bilateral relationships, 
primarily with America and an analysis of how the long period in opposition shaped 
Labor’s later approach to Australian foreign policy.  
None of these historiographical outlooks provides an adequate explanation of the 
Labor Party’s vision for the Alliance. They largely omit the domestic political 
impulses that influenced the conservative Governments’ approach to the Alliance 
during the height of the Cold War. Therefore, this thesis offers a challenge to the 
prevailing views that have long held sway over popular and scholarly conceptions of 
the Labor Party’s vision for the Alliance in Australian foreign policy.  
The primary research for this thesis is derived from a number of sources both in 
Australia and overseas. The Australian sources are predominantly drawn from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  The	  most	  prominent	  examples	  of	  this	  vein	  of	  historiography	  are	  the	  essays	  by	  Gareth	  Evans,	  ‘The	  Labor	  Tradition:	  A	  View	  from	  the	  1990s’;	  Christopher	  Waters,	  ‘Creating	  a	  Tradition:	  The	  Foreign	  Policy	  of	  the	  Curtin	  and	  Chifley	  Governments’;	  David	  Lee,	  ‘The	  Curtin	  and	  Chifley	  Governments:	  Liberal	  Internationalism	  and	  World	  Organisation’;	  and	  Gregory	  Pemberton	  ‘Whitlam	  and	  the	  Labor	  Tradition’,	  all	  from	  David	  Lee	  and	  Christopher	  Waters,	  eds.,	  Evatt	  to	  
Evans	  –The	  Labor	  Tradition	  in	  Australian	  Foreign	  Policy	  (St	  Leonards:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1997).	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extensive collection of Arthur Calwell’s private papers, held by the National Library 
of Australia (NLA). I have also conducted research into the official Government 
records, held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 
Washington D.C. and The National Archives (TNA), London. Using Arthur Calwell’s 
private papers, I have incorporated material ranging from speeches, public statements 
and press releases, to private correspondence and press clippings. I have 
supplemented my research at the NLA with material gathered from London and 
Washington, the majority of which comprise memoranda of visits by ALP leaders, 
official embassy cables between Canberra and Washington and personal 
correspondence between politicians. Much of this material has not yet been used by 
Australian historians.  
This thesis follows a predominantly chronological structure examining the 
significant foreign policy issues encountered by the ALP between 1960 and 1967. 
However, it should be noted that many of these events occurred concurrently, and so 
while each case that is explored may deal with one or two particular intellectual or 
structural issues, it is likely that all of the cases examined exhibited similar pressures 
and features. Taken together, each chapter is written to provide an insight into the 
forces that shaped Labor’s approach to and vision for the Alliance. 
 Chapter One explores the ideological and structural constraints of the Labor 
Party’s foreign policy-making process through the connected issues of Australia’s 
role in the international nuclear debate, and the establishment of the North West Cape 
naval communications base. It highlights the way in which ideological divisions, 
formed by the split of 1955, inhibited Labor’s capacity to manage the Alliance during 
a period in which nuclear testing and disarmament transfixed the geopolitical 
environment. Furthermore, I use the case of North West Cape to explore how an 
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extra-parliamentary policy-making process constrained the parliamentary leadership 
from advancing a coherent Labor narrative on an issue that attracted significant public 
attention. These forces remained unchanged past 1967.  
The second chapter explores how Labor dealt with the challenges presented by the 
end of European colonialism in Asia and the consequent rise of Asian nationalism in 
the post-war period. Situating Labor’s responses to the case of West Papua and 
Confrontation in the broader international political environment of the early 1960s, I 
examine both Labor’s opposition to Indonesia’s annexation of West Papua, and its 
concern that with Britain’s retreat from empire, America would not fill the void.  
The third chapter focuses on Labor’s opposition to Australian and American 
commitments to the Vietnam War. It firstly assesses the implications of a flawed Cold 
War intellectual framework that shaped Australian and American responses to the 
conflict in Indochina. Similarly, I contrast this assessment against the opposing 
appraisal held by the Labor Party. My analysis of the ideology that dictated policy 
during the period provides a foundation for exploring the alternative policy Labor 
outlined, looking particularly at the importance of economic and institutional 
development as the basis for any solution of the conflict. This chapter also evaluates 
Arthur Calwell’s personal perspectives on how Vietnam inhibited America’s moral 
force as the leader of the free world.  
This thesis will argue that between 1960 and 1967 Labor’s fortunes followed the 
contours of their management of the Alliance and that while they were ardently 
committed to the principles of liberal internationalism, they were far more pragmatic 
in adopting ANZUS as the fundamental component of Australian foreign policy. This 
thesis will also explore how Labor came to terms with the rapid changes forced on a 
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predominantly white nation by the retreat of empire and the advent of decolonisation. 
Finally, this thesis will highlight how Labor conceived of America’s role in the world 
and the tension this created when it was compelled to oppose American policy in 
South East Asia without seeking to abandon the Alliance itself. 
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- 1 - 
“WE DO NOT SAY WE ARE UNITED”: 
The Labor Party: An Independent Ally?   
During the early 1960s Labor was confronted by the reality of American nuclear 
power in the Cold War.  The policy debates over North West Cape (hereafter NWC), 
nuclear testing and disarmament reflected Labor’s vision of the Alliance and its role 
in an independent Australian foreign policy. Moreover, these debates illustrated the 
central tension in Labor’s approach to the Alliance. As McLean notes, ‘by the end of 
the 1950s, the US Alliance had acquired pre-eminence in Australian defence policy’.1 
In a hostile and uncertain international environment, Labor’s determination to hold 
views independent from the United States seemed reckless. While there can be no 
doubt that the Labor Party, and Calwell, wholeheartedly supported ANZUS and the 
security provided by an increasingly intimate Alliance, sometimes the measures 
required to maintain it were a ‘grim and awful necessity’.2  
This chapter will highlight how the ideological composition of the party influenced 
the debate on nuclear disarmament and testing. Placing the ideological tension in 
context, this chapter will examine the implications of the 1955 party split. Arguably, 
it is impossible to understand the disagreements over disarmament and NWC without 
exploring how and why such a state of affairs existed. Moreover, the split, and the 
subsequent formation of the Democratic Labor Party (hereafter DLP) eroded Labor’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  David	  McLean,	  From	  British	  Colony	  to	  American	  Satellite?	  Australia	  and	  the	  USA	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  and	  History,	  52,	  no.	  1	  (2006),	  p.	  66.	  	  
2	  Gough	  Whitlam	  on	  the	  North	  West	  Cape	  Agreement	  (1963)	  quoted	  in	  R.G.	  Neale,	  ‘Problems	  of	  Australian	  Foreign	  Policy	  January	  –	  June	  1963’,	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  and	  History,	  9,	  no.	  2	  (November	  1963),	  p.	  139.	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electability in Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland.3 Without this electoral 
albatross, Labor may have been far more capable of providing a unified political 
narrative on the crucial issues of foreign policy confronting Australia during the 
1960s.  
Using the NWC debate, this chapter will explore the policy-making structure of the 
party and the impact it had on the parliamentary leadership’s ability to direct Labor 
foreign policy. Understanding the internal factors shaping Labor’s vision of the 
Alliance sheds light not only on these two cases, but more broadly, on the pressures 
that inhibited Labor’s capacity to respond to all of the foreign policy issues that 
confronted Australia in the 1960s. Consequently, this chapter is designed to provide 
two separate components that taken together illustrate the nature of the Labor Party, 
and the forces behind the various foreign policy responses that the ALP grappled with 
during the period.   
A very foreign schism 
On May 30 1964, The Economist summed up the damage the split of 1955 had 
wrought on the Labor Party lamenting that, ‘When Dr. Evatt destroyed the Labor 
Party, he did so for a generation’.4 In October 1954, Evatt had infamously distributed 
a press statement accusing ‘a small minority of…members’ of creating an ‘almost 
intolerable situation – calculated to deflect… the pursuit of established Labor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Ross	  McMullin,	  The	  Light	  on	  the	  Hill	  the	  Australian	  Labor	  Party	  1891-­1991(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  pp.	  256	  –	  90.	  	  
4	  “Australian	  Politics”,	  The	  Economist,	  30	  May	  1964,	  p.	  969;	  This	  article	  was	  referenced	  in	  The 
Labour Split: Present Realities from Robert L. Walkinshaw to Department of State, 3 September 1964, 
RG 84, General Records US Embassy Canberra, 1962 – 67, Box 1, NARA. 	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objectives and ideals’.5   It was the breaking point in what had been a spiraling 
internecine conflict between Catholic right wing industrial groups and largely 
Protestant left wing members who had cooperated with Communist controlled 
unions.6 Seven members of caucus, who were linked to the groups, were expelled.7 
Those who left formed the political and social basis, alongside B.A. Santamaria’s 
National Civic Council, for the Labor Party (anti-Communist), later to become the 
DLP.8 The provision of DLP preferences to the Coalition was, arguably, one of the 
primary reasons for the longevity of conservative rule.9  
Critical to the split’s permanence was its profound connection to Labor’s broader 
response to the ideological struggle of the Cold War. Notably, Whitlam recalls a 
conversation with John Michael Mullens, one of the parliamentarians expelled from 
caucus, which epitomizes the emotionally charged atmosphere of the 1950s.  After a 
debate on Indochina, Mullens said, ‘I can’t forget that there are two million of my 
fellow-Catholics there who are going to be massacred’.10 This emotive appraisal 
illustrated a prevailing set of assumptions amongst the groups; first, that membership 
of an international Catholic identity placed pressure on a Labor political identity that, 
especially in Victoria, flirted with the Communist Party of Australia; and second, that 
the growing strength of the Communist Party in Asia represented not only an attack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Herbert	  V.	  Evatt,	  Press	  Statement	  on	  The	  Movement	  (1954)	  quoted	  in	  Robert	  Murray,	  The	  Split:	  
Australian	  Labor	  in	  the	  Fifties	  (Melbourne:	  F.W.	  Cheshire	  Publishing,	  1970),	  p.	  180;	  see	  also	  Alan 
Reid, “Evatt’s Hydrogen Bomb”, Sun, 5 October 1954, p. 1. 
6	  Murray,	  The	  Split,	  pp.	  13	  –	  26.	  	  
7	  McMullin,	  The	  Light	  on	  the	  Hill,	  pp.	  276	  –	  77.	  	  
8	  Murray,	  The	  Split,	  p.	  249.	  	  	  
9	  Graham	  Freudenberg,	  A	  Certain	  Grandeur	  (Melbourne:	  Sun	  Books,	  1977),	  p.	  7.	  
10	  E.G.	  Whitlam,	  The	  Whitlam	  Government	  1972-­1975	  (Melbourne:	  Penguin,	  1985),	  p.	  32.	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upon the Catholic faithful, but also the emergence of a monolithic and aggressive bloc 
that stood against the preservation of Western civilization.11 In these circumstances, 
the way the party dealt with domestic and international Communism became an 
emblem for a conflict that would pit friends, families and colleagues against each 
other in one of the most bitter and enduring scenes of political division Australia has 
ever witnessed.12  
Importantly, the split affected individual states differently. Although the epicenter 
of the split was in Victoria, there were also significant ramifications for Western 
Australia and Queensland.13 In New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania, the 
split was largely mitigated through cooperation between the party and the Catholic 
dioceses.14 Critically, the overall impact on the Federal Party was a weakened centre 
and right faction, destroying Labor’s ideological equilibrium and increasing the left 
faction’s power. Consequently, the Alliance and its role in Australian foreign policy 
was significant in determining, and in turn influenced by, factional alignments in the 
Federal ALP.15 Greenwood notes that ‘vital differences’ between the factions were on 
public display throughout the early 1960s. 16 During the debate on nuclear 
disarmament these vital differences were starkly illustrated. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Murray,	  The	  Split,	  pp.	  5	  –	  7.	  	  	  12	  For	  examples	  of	  the	  manifestations	  of	  conflict	  during	  the	  period,	  see	  McMullin,	  The	  Light	  on	  the	  
Hill,	  pp.	  256	  –	  90;	  Don	  Watson,	  Recollections	  of	  a	  Bleeding	  Heart	  (Sydney:	  Knopf,	  2002),	  pp.	  4	  –	  11.	  	  13	  For	  a	  history	  of	  the	  split	  in	  Victoria,	  Queensland	  and	  Western	  Australia,	  see	  Murray,	  The	  Split,	  pp.	  221	  –	  329.	  14	  For	  a	  history	  of	  the	  split	  in	  New	  South	  Wales,	  South	  Australia	  and	  Tasmania,	  see	  Ibid,	  pp.	  281	  –	  307,	  329	  –	  351.	  	  15	  Kim	  C.	  Beazley,	  ‘Federal	  labor	  and	  the	  American	  installations:	  Prelude	  to	  government’,	  
Australian	  Outlook,	  33,	  no.	  2	  (1979),	  p.	  167.	  	  16	  Gordon	  Greenwood,	  ‘Australian	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  Action’,	  in	  Gordon	  Greenwood	  and	  Norman	  Harper,	  eds.,	  Australia	  in	  World	  Affairs	  1961	  –	  1965	  (Melbourne:	  F.W.	  Cheshire,	  1968),	  p.	  15.	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“The hope of mankind lies in total world disarmament” 
The dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki condemned the world 
to the horrible truth of nuclear war. Emperor Hirohito, in his public acceptance of 
Japan’s surrender, announced that the world had seen at first hand a ‘new and most 
cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll 
of many innocent lives’.17 Sadly, Hirohito’s message was left unheeded. As tensions 
between East and West settled into a Cold War, the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Britain and later France conducted tests that fostered the build-up of increasingly 
advanced atomic arsenals capable of obliterating human civilization. In May 1955, the 
UN Disarmament Commission began negotiations ‘to bring to an end the escalation 
of nuclear weapons development’.18 By 1958, the Eisenhower administration had 
agreed to join with the British and Russians to discuss the ‘discontinuance of nuclear 
tests’.19 It seemed that a determination existed on all sides to take tentative steps 
towards the ultimate objective of universal disarmament. Although American 
reluctance ensured that the 1958 Geneva conference did not provide a formal 
moratorium, or a Test Ban Treaty, an informal moratorium lasted until August 1961.20  
Operating in an uneasy truce, the new Democratic Kennedy administration was 
quixotic about the potential for a nuclear test ban. During talks with Premier 
Khrushchev in June 1961, two months before the resumption of Soviet testing, 
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Kennedy still hoped to ‘try again in Geneva’.21 However, by August the USSR 
resumed atmospheric and underground testing.22 Dismayed by the truculence of the 
Soviet decision to increase ‘the danger of a thermo-nuclear holocaust’, Washington 
announced the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing.23 The dangerously volatile 
state of affairs, compounded by the intractability of situations in Berlin and South 
East Asia, threatened to explode in October 1962.  Soviet placement of missiles in 
Cuba edged the world out onto a nuclear precipice. Only painstaking diplomacy and 
concessions from each side halted the spiral towards a third world war.24 It was 
against this complex and fast evolving international scene that the ALP disagreed on 
how best to end the perpetual ‘twilight of death’ in a world dominated by the bomb.25  
Less than three weeks after the United States resumed atmospheric nuclear tests 
over the Pacific Ocean, Calwell told the House of Representatives that the ALP was 
committed to the ‘permanent banning of nuclear weapons tests by all nations’.26 
Furthermore, he urged the House to endorse Labor’s 1961 election campaign promise 	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to pursue ‘through the United Nations’, the ‘realisation of ‘universal disarmament’.27 
Calwell knew that such a statement was anathema to the Government, whose attitude, 
as Grimshaw lamented, was to ‘once again adopt, virtually without criticism, US 
policy’.28 Despite supporting the principle of both disarmament and a test ban, the 
Government was incapable of supporting Calwell because of two issues.29 First, the 
Government was highly aware that Communist China was attempting to develop a 
nuclear weapon. Sir Garfield Barwick asserted that any Australian participation in 
disarmament must remain aware that Communist China was a ‘power…convinced of 
the inevitability of war and consciously working for elimination of the type of society 
of which Australia is a part’.30 This fear was prominent in the Government’s 
justification for opposing the centerpiece of Labor’s anti-nuclear policy, a Southern 
Hemisphere nuclear free zone.  
Second, throughout the early 1960s, Australia had become acutely aware that its 
freedom of independent action in the realm of foreign affairs was contracting. 
Australia’s original great power protector, Britain was gradually leaving the region, 
seeking its future in Europe.31 This withdrawal from Australia’s direct sphere of 
interest led to a diminution of Canberra’s capacity to take an independent stand on 
issues not supported by Washington. In a changing region where Australia’s 
historically derived status was being quickly eroded, subordination to the United 
States was the easier course in the conduct of Australia’s foreign affairs. To advocate, 	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as Calwell did, that Australia should maintain the Alliance as the basis for Australian 
security, but also to seek an independent stance on issues where Australia’s national 
interest diverged from Washington was always going to raise the ire of the 
Government and, significantly, their main ally.  
Disarmament and nuclear testing were connected issues where Labor’s views were 
simply incompatible with the actions of Washington. At the ANZUS council meeting, 
a fortnight prior to Calwell’s speech, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk had 
publicly mused that the futures of Australia and the US were ‘inextricably 
intertwined’.32 He hammered home this message in the context of the nuclear question 
at the Parliamentary dinner held at the meeting’s conclusion, asserting that ‘the 
President…will not accept people who want their kind of world order to move ahead 
of the free world in this nuclear field’.33 This was an explicit reminder: that Australian 
acquiescence in US nuclear policy was expected; and, moreover, that America’s 
assessments of Asian Communism ought to worry Canberra as much as it concerned 
Washington. Yet Calwell was simply not in a position to publicly demur towards 
United States’ actions.  
Between 1960 and 1967 Labor’s policy-making process was essentially the same 
as it had been at Federation.34 Because the ALP was founded as the political wing of a 
broader Labour movement, trade unions had disproportionate control of state 
conferences, the peak state policy bodies. These state conferences in turn elected 
delegates to the Federal Executive and Conference. The policy statements of Federal 	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Conference became decided party policy. Moreover, all Labor members, especially 
parliamentarians, were required to uphold the platform.  Effectively, this subordinated 
the parliamentary leadership to the Federal Conference.35  
Following the split, Conference and the Federal Executive mirrored the ideological 
composition of the state conferences. The strength of the Left faction, while not in the 
absolute majority, manifested itself in the Executive, while the parliamentary wing 
remained the bastion of the Right faction.36 It was therefore possible for the 
parliamentary wing to carry a minority view, which the public took for the party 
position, while the formal party position was decided by the Conference. Though the 
Left would often soften its stance in light of overwhelming public opposition, this 
trend of ideological division, supported by a policy-making process that was both 
anachronistic and had been captured by the Left, undermined the party’s capacity to 
express unanimity on the significant foreign policy questions of the period.  
On 5 May 1962, Labor’s Federal Executive met in what was the first of two 
attempts to decide the party’s position on nuclear disarmament and testing. They 
declared that the party was opposed ‘to nuclear tests at any time by any nation’.37 
Furthermore, they asserted that Australia ought to ‘declare that it would agree not to 
manufacture, acquire or receive nuclear weapons’.38 It was a position that Calwell and 
Whitlam – who were not delegates to the Federal Executive - could not tolerate. Yet, 
the only victory for the parliamentary leadership, in this meeting, was the inclusion of 	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a proposal that called on the Government to initiate a conference on the establishment 
of a Southern Hemisphere nuclear free zone.39  
Whitlam, who was the progenitor of the Southern Hemisphere proposal, advocated 
the immediate initiation, by the Government, of a conference which sought ‘with all 
of the nations in the Southern Hemisphere’, the establishment of a ‘nuclear free zone’ 
that would extend the 1960 Antarctic Treaty from its perimeter at the 60th parallel of 
latitude to the equator.40 Contrary to the Government’s opposition, this proposal 
Whitlam asserted ‘would in no way jeopardize American or Western defence’.41 
Moreover, such arrangements would ‘in no way promote or facilitate anti-Western 
aggression’.42 Rather he argued that ‘Australia’s defence would be promoted if other 
countries were party to such a proposal’.43 Fundamentally, Whitlam’s proposal was 
designed to mollify the anti-nuclear Left while not necessarily locking a future Labor 
government into a strict anti-nuclear policy.  
 
Critically, these were the publicly held positions of the Party until its second 
meeting on 5 July 1962. More than any difference of opinion on the policy, the 
interlude between the party’s first public statement and the July resolution revealed 
the conflict between the factions over how to deal with the issue. Calwell was placed 
in the awkward position of advancing a policy that went against both public sentiment 
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and the warnings from Washington.44 In the parliamentary debate, less than a 
fortnight later, Calwell attempted to mitigate any potential damage the party’s 
temporary rebuke to American policy might cause, stating that the:  
United States has a dual responsibility in the world today. First, the United 
States must look to its own security. … Secondly, her position as leader and 
protector of the Western alliance imposes upon the United States a heavy 
responsibility…Recognising this, the Labor Party has always supported the 
American view that any nuclear arms ban must be part of a general program of 
total and complete disarmament…Australia has its part to play in the Western 
alliance; and that implies our right, or rather duty, to defend ourselves in the 
event of war by whatever means circumstances may dictate.45  
Calwell had tacitly acknowledged that Australian acquiescence to American testing 
was a fait accompli. Moreover, he contradicted the Executive: a Labor government 
would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons if the circumstances dictated. In the 
context of the Executive’s statement on the matter Calwell could not be said to have 
expressed formal Labor policy. The Right, mainly led by NSW, was dismayed that 
the Left would equivocate on the matter, when it was clear that doing so gave 
credence to the Government’s arguments against Labor’s policies. They were rightly 
concerned that even the mere perception of a divide on such a momentous question 
would harden the public suspicion of the ALP’s ability to handle questions of foreign 
policy satisfactorily.   
Yet, as long as the Executive delayed the decision on what construed formal party 
policy, the Left would continue to advocate a position that valued absolute idealism 
over compromise and pragmatism. This was explicitly illustrated by Leslie Haylen’s 
representation of the Left’s views in the May parliamentary debate. Haylen 
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emphasized that nuclear disarmament and testing was a ‘moral issue’. 46 To Haylen, it 
did ‘ not matter whether it was Khrushchev or Kennedy letting off bombs’.47 This 
obviously contrasted starkly with the majority view of the parliamentary party, and 
certainly with the view of both Calwell and Whitlam. Yet, to Haylen it was entirely 
satisfactory that there should be ‘violent feelings in our party over this matter’.48 
Extending this defence of the equivocation within the ALP, Haylen argued that 
though ‘we do not say that we are united’, on the nuclear question, there is unanimity 
in the party’s desire to ‘save the world for the peoples of the world’.49 Furthermore, to 
Haylen, militancy was entirely pragmatic. Basing Australia’s security on the question 
of ‘how much the Americans have got and how much the Russians have got’ gambled 
everything on a ‘balance of terror’.50 In reality, this position did not stray particularly 
far from the principles the ALP universally espoused. Nor, it might be argued, did it 
appear very different from the position the Kennedy administration held.51 However, 
it diverged from the dominant perspective of the parliamentary party in its refusal to 
acknowledge the incremental nature of any disarmament policy and the constraints of 
the Cold War.  
By July, with public opinion firmly against the left’s position, the Executive 
grudgingly agreed to the compromise outlined by the leadership.52 In what The Age 
called a ‘major victory for the Right wing’, both the proposal for a conference on a 
Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Free Zone and the reservation to use nuclear weapons 
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was included in the party platform.53 The policy now read, ‘Labor declares it will not 
be the first nation to stockpile nuclear weapons in its territories in peacetime’.54 This 
amendment provided a resolution to two separate problems. First, it seemingly 
nullified the Government charge that Labor would leave Australia defenceless should 
China obtain a nuclear weapon.55 Second, it provided a compromise for the Left who, 
while still ardently opposed to any possession of nuclear weapons, acknowledged the 
domestic implications of a policy that would assist the Government’s attempts to 
paint the party as weak on defence.  
Unfortunately, this was a pyrrhic victory for the parliamentary leadership. 
Declaring two alternate policies in the space of two months had lent unfounded 
credibility to the Government’s claim that Labor could not be trusted on foreign 
policy. If there was any opportunity for the Labor party to ameliorate the public 
perspective on this issue it was decisively lost during the Cuban missile crisis. Soviet 
aggression in Cuba lent legitimacy to any paranoid claim of Asian Communist 
expansionism. Taken collectively alongside the other major international and 
domestic issues of the Twenty-Fourth Parliament, the party’s internal disagreement 
over disarmament assisted the conservative Government’s landslide re-election in 
November 1963. Reflecting on why Labor lost the election, the Bulletin chastised 
Calwell on ‘expecting the people of this country to have swallowed the absurdities of 
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a nuclear-free zone which would leave this country virtually defenceless’.56 Though 
centrally concerned with the issue of Australian sovereignty, the imbroglio over NWC 
brought sharply into focus the impact on Australian foreign policy of the Alliance in a 
nuclear age.   
“We will never cede one inch of our territory, or permit the diminution by one iota of 
the rights of our Government and people” 
On 17 May 1962 Menzies announced the Government’s approval for the 
establishment of an American naval communications facility at NWC.57 It was the 
Prime Minister’s only statement in both the parliament and in public until 26 March 
1963. Indeed, it seemed as if the aim of the Government was to misrepresent the 
purpose of the base long enough for the ALP to question its establishment. Barwick 
described the facility as ‘a wireless station, nothing more nor less’.58 But NWC was 
far more than a wireless station. It was actually a key installation in the US nuclear 
defence network, capable of sending radio communications to submarines armed with 
Polaris missiles in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.59  
Before examining the impact Labor’s policy-making structure had in impeding the 
parliamentary leadership’s capacity to decide on ALP policy, it is worth exploring the 
reasons the base became such an issue. On 9 May 1963, Australia and the US signed 
the NWC Agreement that provided for the establishment of the station.60 Essentially, 
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twenty-eight square miles at Exmouth Bay in WA.61 The basic premise of a foreign 
power establishing a military facility on Australian territory during peacetime was an 
issue for Labor, but the matter of territorial sovereignty was not the most pressing 
concern.62 The substantive issue was over the question of Australian Government 
control. Would the Australian defence forces technically retain operative joint control 
over the facility alongside the United States? Furthermore, would the Australian 
Government have control, and therefore veto, over any communication that may draw 
Australia into a war without prior consent? All of the questions that were finally 
posed by Labor as conditions of support for the bill before parliament related to 
whether Australia would maintain complete sovereignty in relation to the base. As 
Calwell opined in his speech on the bill, the Labor Party ‘will never cede one inch of 
our territory, or permit the diminution by one iota of the rights of our Government and 
people’.63 Arguably, Calwell’s concerns were not abstract. Article Four of the treaty 
arrangement stipulated that:  
The communication services of the station will be available to the Australian 
armed forces in accordance with technical arrangements made by the co-
operating agencies of the two Governments.64 
Neither the Australian Government nor the United States interpreted this clause as the 
basis for joint control.  
Barwick, in an attempt to paint Labor’s conditions as anti-American, released a 
letter from the US Ambassador to Canberra, which stated bluntly that the agreement:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  T.B	  Millar,	  Australia	  in	  Peace	  and	  War:	  External	  Relations	  Since	  1788	  (Sydney:	  Australian	  National	  University	  Press,	  2,	  1991),	  p.	  176.	  	  
62	  For	  an	  exposition	  of	  this	  concern	  within	  the	  party	  see:	  Allan	  Fraser,	  CPD, H. of R., 29 November 
1962 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1962), p. 2737. 	  
63	  Calwell,	  CPD,	  16	  May	  1963,	  p.	  1488.	  	  64	  The	  North	  West	  Cape	  Agreement	  (9	  May	  1963)	  Meaney,	  Australia	  and	  the	  World,	  p.	  653.	  	  
	  36	  	  
…is not intended to restrict the Government of Australia’s right of consultation 
but to spell out clearly that consultation does not carry with it any degree of 
control over the station or its use.65 
The memorandum itself went into greater detail and seemed to have been consciously 
worded with reference to the central focus of the ALP’s by now public conditions:  
It was clearly understood that consultation connoted no more than consultation 
and was not intended to establish Australian control over use of the station nor 
to imply any Government of Australia design to restrict at any time United 
States Government use of station for defence communications including, for 
example, communications to Polaris submarines. It is also understood that it 
was not intended to give Australia control over or access to contents of 
messages transmitted over the station.66 
 
It was stunning that Barwick was enthusiastic in placing on the public record a 
document that was not only a rebuke to the Labor position but was also an emphatic 
statement of the Government’s willingness to subordinate Australia’s sovereignty 
over the base to the United States. Yet, in the context of a dangerously febrile 
international environment, the letter advanced the Government’s charge that Labor’s 
actions reflected a callous disregard for the immediate needs of Australia’s security.  
The Government’s view of the Labor position may have served the purposes of 
political victory but it also fundamentally misunderstood, or actively misrepresented 
the philosophy Labor and Calwell held on the Alliance and on Australia’s 
responsibilities as a small to middle power.  
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36 Faceless Men 
On 23 March 1963, The Daily Telegraph’s front page carried a photo of Labor’s  
parliamentary leadership anxiously waiting outside the Kingston Hotel in Canberra.67 
Excluded from a hastily arranged Federal Conference called to define the party’s 
NWC policy, Whitlam and Calwell looked impotent.68 It was an event that would 
become immortalized by Menzies’ adoption of the Telegraph’s jibe at Labor’s ‘36 
Faceless Men’. 69 Essentially, the conference exposed both a party divided by 
ideologically distinct factions, and a party structure that supported this state of affairs 
whilst simultaneously removing the autonomous capacity of the parliamentary 
leadership to direct the party’s publicly stated policy. As Calwell and Whitlam stood 
outside, a tired and drained Federal Executive debated the party’s position. Finally, 
Jack Duggan (Queensland Opposition Leader) split from his state delegation and cast 
the deciding vote on a motion providing provisional support for NWC.70 In what was 
a victory for the party leadership, it is important to understand that two fundamentally 
contradictory propositions were put before the Conference.  
The minority opinion was firmly held by Left Faction delegates from Victoria, 
Queensland and WA. The presence of the split was unmistakable. The left contended 
that even conditional support for NWC made ‘arrant nonsense’ of Labor’s nuclear 
free zone policy.71 Though this view held some merit on the basis of the principle 	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expressed by the party in its July 1962 statement, it ignored the fundamental fact that 
Labor policy was not a universal commitment to the establishment of a nuclear free 
zone, but rather a promise to initiate a conference at which such arrangements may be 
made. Further, the base did not contravene party policy because it was not being used 
to stockpile fissile material.  
The second criticism made was that the policy represented a ‘total and irrevocable 
commitment to the United States policy, leaving us no room for regional agreements 
with Asian countries’.72 This criticism bares testimony to the crux of the problem 
experienced by Labor throughout the 1960s. How could a subordinate position in the 
Alliance, unrelated to the obvious power imbalance between the two nations, provide 
enough scope for the exercise of independent decision making in the conduct of 
Australia’s external affairs? It is an important question not only because it defined the 
conduct of the party’s foreign policy in Opposition but also because it illustrated the 
underlying philosophy held by Labor in the conduct of Australia’s foreign relations, 
both in and out of Government. Though the party always recognised the necessity of 
great power protection they were determined to retain the sovereign capacity of an 
independent nation to agree or disagree with their allies.  
The concept of a subordinating partner rather than an independent ally was 
undoubtedly central to Calwell’s approach to the public debate. He goaded Menzies 
and the Government exhorting, that ‘Australia is still – I use the qualification 
deliberately – an independent nation’.73 Accordingly, in all its arrangements with 
foreign powers the ultimate objective must be to ‘guarantee and enhance’ both 
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sovereignty and Australia’s international integrity.74 This was not an abstract concern 
for Calwell or Labor; indeed, the matter was inextricably linked to the ‘concept of 
sovereignty in a nuclear age’.75 The issue was the degree to which Australia was now 
a genuine military target. The Federal Conference had rather ambiguously dealt with 
the problem stating:  
In the event of the USA being at war or threatened with war by another power, 
Australian territory and … facilities must not be used in any way that would 
involve Australia without the prior knowledge and consent of the 
…Government.76 
Although this was primarily concerned with the inalienable right of the Government 
to withdraw consent to any action that drew Australia into a conflict, it also illustrated 
the underlying assumption that an American base with nuclear capacity on Australian 
territory heightened the risk of attack. Calwell reiterated his concern that Australia 
was limiting its capacity to remain out of a potential nuclear conflict, lamenting that 
‘whether we like it or not, we are taking a step closer to the firing line’.77  
Whether he liked it or not, Labor’s position on the base was not accepted by the 
media, nor the majority of the public as credible policy. A Gallup Poll found that 
‘Australians are overwhelmingly in favour of America building its proposed radio 
station’.78 Eighty percent supported the base, including a staggering seventy-four 
percent of Labor voters. Those polled opined that ‘America is our main hope for 
defence; they saved us before’.79 Public opinion, it seemed, was ignoring the 
subtleties of Calwell’s call for an independent ally in favour of Menzies’ baser appeal 
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to fear.  Although it is impossible to specifically identify how this public support 
developed, it is important to note that the Australian press weighed in heavily on the 
side of an unconditional agreement. The Herald castigated the Labor Party’s 
‘theoretical objections which do not match the realities of defence in the nuclear 
age’.80 The Sydney Morning Herald echoed Menzies’ line that the conditions laid 
down by the Federal Conference were a ‘miserable compromise’.81  
Unfortunately for Calwell the damage done by the imbroglio over the base was 
largely self-inflicted. The decision to refer the matter to a Federal Conference was an 
abdication of leadership draped in the trappings of extra-parliamentary democracy. 
When in October 1962 the Federal Secretary, F.E. Chamberlain submitted an 
amendment to the party’s statement on nuclear policy prohibiting the establishment of 
a base ‘that could be used for the manufacture, firing or control of any nuclear missile 
or vehicle capable of carrying nuclear missiles’ it was clear that the issue would not 
be resolved without conflict.82 Yet, Calwell’s response took over six months to 
materialise.  
Finally, on 5 March 1963, Calwell attempted to broker a compromise at a specially 
convened meeting in Sydney. Though the matter was left unresolved, the 
parliamentary leadership was able to make it clear to the Federal Executive that Labor 
should provide conditional support for NWC. Whitlam in particular, having recently 
returned from discussions in Washington, advanced the importance of support.83 Yet, 
rather than use this meeting as the basis to make a public announcement on the party’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  “Labor and The Base” The Herald, 10 June 1963, p. 2.  
81	  “Calwell	  Challenges	  Menzies	  to	  Election	  on	  U.S.	  Base”,	  23	  March	  1963,	  p.	  1.	  	  82	  Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs (1963). 	  83	  Whitlam	  met	  with	  Dean	  Rusk	  in	  Washington	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  1962,	  see	  Report of the Special 
Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs (1963).	  
	  41	  	  
policy through parliament, Calwell demurred, requesting a special Federal Conference 
be convened to decide on the matter. It should be made clear, that it was well within 
Calwell’s power as leader of the parliamentary party to interpret or develop policy if 
the circumstances dictated. A Federal Conference was certainly not required, even if 
the issue was significantly contentious. The only justification for this measure was the 
inherent conservatism of Labor’s policy-making traditions. 
Menzies excoriated Labor for being subject to ‘outside interference and 
domination’. 84 This was an effective political barb, though it was not a particularly 
fair criticism. Coming too late to mitigate the fallout, Calwell’s valid response 
asserted that all Labor had done was ‘write into our party constitution…what every 
other political party does, in practice, no matter how surreptitiously they do it, and no 
matter how piously they deny it’.85 Where this argument fell down was in its 
conservative appeal to the practices of the past, practices that were simply not 
appropriate for the challenges that parliamentary democracies and political leaders 
faced in the nuclear age. Calwell’s cognitive dissonance on the problem proved to be 
his undoing. As he stood huddled with the other parliamentary leaders under the pale 
glow of the electric lamp in the Kingston Hotel’s front courtyard, the leader of the 
Opposition appeared impotent and subject to the decision of thirty-five faceless men 
and one woman.86
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Conclusion 
Both NWC and the debate over nuclear testing and disarmament illustrated the 
forces and structures that framed Labor’s conceptualisation of the American Alliance 
and its role in Australia’s relations with world. The ideological composition forged in 
the split profoundly shaped the party’s approach to the large foreign policy issues of 
the 1960s. While far from an all-encompassing dogma, the comparatively neutralist 
perspective of the Left towards the Alliance inhibited Labor’s capacity to present an 
image of unity on issues that both involved America and were of direct import to the 
electorate.  
Furthermore, this disadvantage was increased by a policy-making structure that 
was both anachronistic and counterproductive to the requirements of leadership in the 
nuclear age. However, overriding the implications of factional division and structural 
ineffectiveness was the fundamental reality of the Cold War. In a volatile and 
uncertain international environment, Labor’s determination to stand independently 
within the Alliance seemed anathema to Australia’s national interest. Though there 
can be no doubt that Calwell, and Labor supported ANZUS, sometimes the measures 
required to maintain it were a grim and awful necessity.
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- 2 - 
THE LIMITS OF ANZUS: 
Labor, the Alliance and Australia’s Northern Neighbours   
Throughout the 1960s Australia’s gaze was fixed upon the transformation of the 
neighbourhood to its north.  It dictated the actions of policymakers both in 
Government and in Opposition. It was a period in which an old colonial civilization 
passed away and a new Asian nationalism asserted itself on the world stage. The 
centre of this evolution, at least in the preoccupation of Australian historiography and 
of the popular history of the Alliance relationship, was the conflict in Vietnam.1 
However, though attracting less attention, a far more fundamental relationship was 
being developed that not only informed how Australia thought about its region, but 
also how the international community viewed the cold war in Asia.  
From 1949 Indonesia was ruled by President Sukarno, a staunch nationalist and 
anti-colonialist.2 Sukarno’s own policies were strongly influenced by the bitter 
experience of Dutch colonialism.3 Through this historical experience Sukarno 
developed his own doctrine of ‘new emerging forces’.4 Essentially, this amounted to a 
personal and national crusade to remove the last vestiges of colonialism in the region. 
The first exercise of this doctrine was for the territory of West Papua, known until 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Australian	  cold	  war	  historiography	  has	  been	  heavily	  focused	  on	  the	  Alliance	  relationship	  that	  was	  cultivated	  in	  Vietnam.	  “Vietnam	  Syndrome”	  has	  diminished	  the	  importance	  of	  Indonesia	  as	  a	  key	  component	  in	  cold	  war	  strategy.	  See	  David	  McLean,	  ‘Australia	  in	  the	  Cold	  War:	  A	  Historiographical	  Review’,	  The	  International	  History	  Review,	  23,	  no.	  2	  (June	  2001),	  p.	  299;	  David	  Webster,	  ‘Regimes	  in	  Motion:	  The	  Kennedy	  Administration	  and	  Indonesia’s	  New	  Frontier,	  1960	  –	  1962’,	  Diplomatic	  History,	  33,	  no.	  1	  (January	  2009),	  p.	  101;	  John	  Subritzky,	  Confronting	  Sukarno:	  
British,	  American,	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Diplomacy	  in	  the	  Malaysian-­Indonesian	  
Confrontation,	  1961-­5	  (London:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2000),	  pp.	  94	  –	  114.	  	  
2	  Indonesian	  sovereignty	  was	  signed	  over	  to	  Dr.	  Sukarno	  and	  Mohammed	  Hatta	  at	  a	  bilateral	  conference	  in	  The	  Hague	  on	  2	  November	  1949,	  see	  Bruce	  Grant,	  Indonesia	  (Melbourne,	  MUP,	  3,	  1996),	  pp.	  31	  –	  32.	  	  	  
3	  Subritzky,	  Confronting	  Sukarno,	  p.	  1.	  	  4	  Ibid.	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1962 as Netherlands New Guinea.5 With the acquiescence of the United States, the 
resignation of the Australian Government, and the belated withdrawal of the Dutch, 
the dispute was resolved in Sukarno’s favour in 1962. With the long crusade to 
incorporate West Papua into the Republic of Indonesia completed, Sukarno turned his 
attention to the British plan for a new Federation of Malaysia.6 From 1963 through till 
1965 a series of crises best known as Konfrontasi (Confrontation) involved the new 
state, and Australia’s original Great Power protector, Britain. Australia, as a member 
of the Commonwealth, was drawn into the conflict.  
Since the Curtin and Chifley Governments, Labor had been committed to an 
idealistic vision of Australia’s approach to international affairs. As a result, Labor 
developed a liberal internationalist toolkit to approach the problems of the post-war 
world, as discussed in the introductory Chapter. Fundamentally, Labor was guided by 
a belief that international conflict could be resolved through multilateral institutions 
rather than the power politics of force that prevailed during the Cold War.7 This 
chapter demonstrates how this underlying philosophical framework directed and 
influenced the Labor Party’s position on the West New Guinea crisis. With specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  naming	  of	  the	  territory	  is	  contentious.	  The	  Dutch	  called	  it	  Netherlands	  New	  Guinea;	  the	  Indonesians	  Irian	  Barat	  (West	  Irian)	  and	  later	  Irian	  Jaya	  (Victorious	  Irian);	  the	  indigenous	  nationalist	  movement	  prefer	  Papua	  Barat	  (West	  Papua).	  Papua	  is	  now	  recognised	  by	  Indonesia,	  see	  Webster,	  ‘Regimes	  in	  Motion’,	  p.	  95.	  President	  Sukarno	  first	  declared	  Indonesia’s	  intentions	  to	  annex	  the	  territory	  on	  28	  December	  1949	  see	  Glen	  St	  Barclay,	  Friends	  in	  High	  Places:	  
Australian-­American	  diplomatic	  relations	  since	  1945	  (Melbourne:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  p.	  100.	  	  
6	  Malaya	  had	  been	  granted	  independence	  in	  1957	  see	  Parliament	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  
Federation	  of	  Malaya	  Independence	  Act,	  1957	  (London:	  HM	  Stationery	  Office,	  1957),	  created	  2002,	  The	  National	  Archives,	  UK,	  <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1957/60/pdfs/ukpga_19570060_en.pdf>,	  viewed	  15	  August	  2012;	  The	  Federation	  of	  Malaysia	  included	  Malaya,	  Sarawak	  and	  Sabah	  and	  Singapore	  (Singapore	  was	  expelled	  10	  August	  1965)	  see	  Gordon	  Greenwood,	  ‘Australian	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  Action’,	  in	  Gordon	  Greenwood	  and	  Norman	  Harper,	  eds.,	  Australia	  in	  World	  Affairs	  1961	  –	  1965	  (Melbourne:	  F.W.	  Cheshire,	  1968),	  pp.	  95	  –	  102.	  	  	  
7	  Ibid,	  p.	  48.	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reference to Confrontation, this chapter examines Labor’s fear that Britain’s retreat 
from empire would leave a void not adequately filled by the Alliance.  
This chapter will also highlight Calwell’s response to the West Papua dispute. His 
commitment to the principles of liberal internationalism will be contrasted with both 
the Government’s realist position and the broader international environment that 
shaped the American determination to ensure Indonesian neutrality. A closer 
examination of these connected viewpoints demonstrates the difficulty Calwell 
experienced in reconciling the party’s commitment to the principles of liberal 
internationalism against the broader requirements of Australia’s role in the Alliance 
during the Cold War.  
 ‘Reminiscent of Hitler’s performances at the time of Munich’ 
Indonesian independence in 1949 did not preclude the Netherlands from 
stubbornly resisting withdrawal from its remaining colonial territory. The decision to 
retain Netherlands New Guinea was a festering sore in relations between the new 
Indonesian state and their former colonial masters. Indonesia demanded the territory 
be “returned to fold of the motherland”, and explicitly threatened an irredentist war to 
achieve such ends.8 In 1954 Djakarta took its claim to the UN. It garnered the 
requisite two-thirds majority in the committee stage, but failed to replicate the 
necessary majority in the General Assembly.9 Following a similarly failed attempt to 
gain UN recognition of Indonesia’s claim in 1957, relations between The Hague and 
Djakarta soured. Sukarno’s response was immediate, announcing the nationalisation 
of Dutch corporations that dominated the Indonesian economy and the expulsion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Webster,	  ‘Regimes	  in	  Motion’,	  p.	  95.	  	  9	  The	  UN	  rejected	  the	  Indonesian	  claim	  on	  10	  December	  1954	  see	  “Holland	  Ready	  for	  Talks”,	  
Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  13	  December	  1954,	  p.	  2.	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forty seven thousand Dutch nationals. 10  Consequently, Indonesia was thrown into 
economic and social chaos.11 The tumult caused by Sukarno’s reaction lasted until 
1959 when he proclaimed his vision of ‘guided democracy’.12 In the new Indonesia, 
with Sukarno as guide of the perpetual revolution to rid Asia of colonial remnants, the 
conflict over Dutch New Guinea veered towards military conflict.  
However, with the advent of the new Kennedy administration and the increasing 
military aid from Moscow to Djakarta, Washington fervently sought a plan to defuse 
the possibility of Indonesia falling into the Communist camp.13 Consequently, the US 
acted as a mediator between the Dutch and Indonesians. The eventual agreement over 
the American authored Bunker Plan to transfer Dutch sovereignty to Indonesia 
through a temporary UN administration ended the long-running dispute over West 
Papua.14   
To understand the eventual facilitation by the United States of Indonesia’s 
annexation of West Papua, it is worth revisiting the broad context of international 
affairs that shaped superpower strategy in Asia during the 1960s.  Throughout the 
early 1960s the nationalist movements forcing rapid decolonisation dominated 
international affairs. Between 1960 and 1963 twenty one former colonial possessions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Grant,	  Indonesia,	  p.	  36.	  	  11	  Ibid.	  	  12	  Webster,	  ‘Regimes	  in	  Motion’,	  p.	  99.	  	  13	  On	  11	  November	  1961	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Rusk	  sent	  a	  Memorandum	  to	  Kennedy	  stating	  that	  should	  the	  North	  Vietnamese	  succeed	  in	  capturing	  South	  Vietnam	  then	  ‘The	  remainder	  of	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  Indonesia	  would	  move	  to	  a	  complete	  accommodation	  with	  Communism,	  if	  not	  formal	  incorporation	  within	  the	  Communist	  bloc’,	  see	  Memorandum,	  Rusk	  and	  McNamara	  to	  Kennedy,	  11	  November	  1961,	  Papers	  John	  Fitzgerald	  Kennedy,	  National	  Security	  Files,	  Country	  File,	  Vietnam,	  Box	  195,	  Kennedy	  Presidential	  Library;	  see	  also	  Arthur	  Schlesinger	  Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in The White House (New York, Mariner Books, 
2002), p. 533. 	  
14	  Webster,	  ‘Regimes	  in	  Motion’,	  pp.	  118	  –	  123.	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were admitted to the UN.15 George Ball, US under-secretary of state from 1961 to 
1968 remarked that Kennedy’s foreign policy necessarily ‘focused on the problems 
involving the bits and pieces of disintegrating empires’.16 America’s engagement with 
the advent of decolonisation through the ideological framework of the Cold War 
centred US strategy on developing pro-Western or neutralist regimes in Asia.  
Contrastingly, for both Peking and Moscow, the momentum of decolonisation 
offered an opportunity to advance their own strategic interests. By fostering and 
supporting anti-colonialist nationalism, particularly in Asia, they hoped to acquire 
greater influence amongst the region’s emerging states.17 However, despite the shared 
objectives of international Marxism, Peking and Moscow were rivals rather than allies 
for influence in Asia. Since Khrushchev’s 1956 denunciation of Stalin, the U.S.S.R 
had been moving steadily towards détente with the US. The leadership in Peking 
became increasingly critical of Soviet foreign policy, partly because of domestic 
turmoil, but essentially because détente inhibited the expansive nature of global 
Communism.18 The West had hoped throughout the 1950s for a Sino-Soviet schism. 
However, it did not have the immediate effect desired by Washington policymakers. 
Instead of inhibiting the Communist powers’ development of regional influence, it 
actively compelled both powers to focus their efforts on a rapidly emerging Asia. The 
creation of a tripartite conflict for influence between the split Communist powers and 
America set the stage for the major geopolitical conflicts of the 1960s.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  United	  Nations,	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  created	  3	  July	  2006/	  updated	  2012,	  The	  United	  Nations,	  <http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml>,	  viewed	  10	  September	  2012.	  	  16	  Thomas	  G.	  Paterson,	  ‘John	  F.	  Kennedy’s	  Quest	  for	  Victory	  and	  Global	  Crisis’,	  in	  Thomas	  G.	  Paterson	  eds.,	  Kennedy’s	  Quest	  for	  Victory:	  American	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1961	  –	  1963	  (New	  York,	  OUP,	  1989),	  p.	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  17	  Subritzky,	  Confronting	  Sukarno,	  p.	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  Roderick	  MacFarquhar,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution:	  V.	  III	  -­	  The	  Coming	  of	  the	  
Cataclysm	  1961	  –	  1966	  (New	  York,	  OUP,	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  pp.	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The New Frontiersmen of the Kennedy administration provided a shift from the 
policies of the Eisenhower years. It was readily apparent that Kennedy’s presidency 
was going to be marked by a vigorous and activist foreign policy. Announcing that 
America would ‘pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any 
friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty’, Kennedy signaled 
his intention to combat the spread of Communist influence in the world’s emerging 
periphery.19 Moreover, the Kennedy worldview featured greater attention for and 
sympathy towards third world nationalism. David Webster has argued that the 
Kennedy years evinced ‘a consistent trend towards activism, an intensified reliance on 
modernization theory, and a continued adherence to the same Cold War mental maps 
used by policy makers since the 1940s’.20  
Consequently, Kennedy’s brand of foreign policy aimed to spread modernity 
throughout the world as a means of neutralizing or fostering positive relations. As 
proponents of modernisation theory, the administration’s foreign policy focused 
heavily on economic and developmental tools to assist and hasten the growth of 
vulnerable countries important to US strategic interest. Furthermore, Kennedy sought 
to redress the ‘drift and impotence’ of the 1950s.21 His intention was to develop an 
internationally resonant synergy between the “greatness” of American economic and 
military capacity and the idealism of American “goodness”.22 Kennedy’s new frontier 
vision, shaped by the concept that ‘America can succeed at anything’, centred on the 
developing nations of Indonesia, The Philippines, Micronesia and the developed 	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  John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  Inaugural	  Address	  (Washington:	  20	  January	  1961)	  contained	  in,	  The	  Penguin	  
Book	  of	  Twentieth	  Century	  Speeches	  (London:	  Penguin,	  3,	  1999),	  p.	  298.	  	  
20	  Webster,	  ‘Regimes	  in	  Motion’,	  p.	  100.	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  Thomas	  Brown,	  JFK:	  History	  of	  an	  Image	  (Indiana:	  Bloomington,	  1988),	  p.	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  Timothy	  P.	  Maga,	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  and	  the	  New	  Pacific	  Community,	  1961	  –	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nations of Australia and Japan.23 The State Department coined the term “New Pacific 
Community”, which in essence brought together the various intellectual strands of 
administration thinking on American power in the Pacific.24 This reframing of US 
international strategy, which was by now broadly centred on Asia, transformed 
neutral and third world states like Indonesia into potential partners in the containment 
of Communist, particularly Chinese, expansionism.  
This vision altered the administration’s assessment of the West Papua dispute. 
Though Kennedy may have held latent sympathies for the desire of Papuans to self-
determine, the administration’s view was that Indonesia was simply worth more than 
the ‘Papuan inhabitants of West New Guinea’ who ‘were barely out of the stone 
age’.25 Any nascent support for the Netherlands’ independence plan, supported by 
both the Australian Government and Opposition, was essentially crushed by two 
factors. First, Sukarno had been growing increasingly reliant on military aid from 
Moscow following a failed CIA supported rebellion in Sumatra during 1958.26 The 
United States could simply not afford to lose Indonesia to the Communist bloc. In 
addition, American foreign policy was consistently hampered throughout the 1960s, 
where self-determination along ethno-cultural lines was concerned. Arguing for 
anything short of a desegregationist approach to developing nationalisms, especially 
in the Indonesian case, would have reflected poorly on American policymakers who 
were increasingly vexed by domestic racial politics.27 Therefore, a combination of 
activism and modernisation viewed through the strategic prism of the Cold War 
converged to facilitate the annexation by Indonesia of West Papua. For Australian 	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  Ibid,	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  p.	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  Schlesinger,	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  Thousand	  Days,	  p.	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  26	  Maga,	  John	  F.	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  Gerald	  Horne,	  ‘Race	  from	  Power:	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  General	  Crisis	  of	  “White	  Supremacy”’,	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policymakers this underlined the impotence of Australia’s ability to influence 
Washington when policy priorities diverged.  
Fundamentally, the difference in assessments of the dispute related to the basic fact 
that Indonesia was Australia’s closest neighbour. For Australia, a nation that had long 
feared the Yellow Peril, the West Papua dispute enhanced fears of geographic 
isolation and invasion. Moreover, the dispute over West Papua had a long history. By 
1961 it had become a perennial problem in the making of Australian foreign policy. 
Between 1950 and 1959, the Government’s determination had been shaped by Percy 
Spender’s assessment that ‘New Guinea is an absolutely essential link in the chain of 
defence’.28 Bruce Grant has correctly argued that Australia’s view of the dispute 
rested on the ‘fear that if Indonesia were given West New Guinea it would be but a 
matter of time…when the claim will be pushed further so as to include the trust 
territory of Australia New Guinea’.29 This strategic consideration informed the 
political position that ‘the Australian Government does not consider that Indonesia 
has any valid claim’.30 Consequently, Australia made diplomatic efforts to ensure that 
both Washington and London supported the maintenance of Dutch sovereignty over 
the territory.31 Australian attempts to manoeuvre Britain and the US into sharing their 
view of the situation failed, and Australia was forced to alter its position. 
Almost a decade of dispute had passed when Australia and Indonesia jointly 
announced that:  
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  Arthur	  Calwell,	  CPD,	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if any agreement were reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia, as 
parties principal, arrived at by peaceful processes and in accordance with 
internationally accepted principles, Australia would not oppose such an 
agreement.32 
This signaled the first stage in the Government’s policy reversal. Yet the assessment 
did not yet constitute the abandonment of Australia’s hope that the Dutch would 
continue to manage the territory. It was a hope left unfulfilled.  
Menzies, who would hold the dual offices of Prime Minister and Minister for 
External Relations between 1960 and 1961, dealt with the issue rather tendentiously. 
Withdrawing to the comfort of a traditional euro-centric worldview, he found the 
opportunity to humiliate Sukarno and demonstrate Australian Opposition on West 
New Guinea at an unprecedented session of the UN General Assembly.33 Sukarno 
sponsored a resolution calling for a bilateral meeting between Eisenhower and 
Khrushchev on disarmament. Menzies, mistaken in the belief that the Sukarno plan 
ought to be extended to a quadripartite grouping, inclusive of all nuclear powers, 
submitted an amendment.34 It garnered the votes of America, Britain, France and 
Canada.35 The other Commonwealth Countries opposed the measure.36  
By effectively sabotaging Sukarno’s resolution Menzies had damaged Australia’s 
standing in the increasingly sizeable Afro-Asian anti-colonialist bloc in the General 
Assembly. It proved a decisive blunder. Had the Government eventually sought to 
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determination, the hardened resolve in the Afro-Asian bloc would almost certainly 
have ignored Australia’s wishes. Effectively, Australia now clung to the vague hope 
that the US and Britain, who had shown no support for the Australian view, would 
reverse their position and support Dutch control while the slow process toward self-
determination continued. When the Government was forced to abandon support for 
the Dutch in January 1962 it became evident that their hope had been in vain.37  
Labor, and Calwell in particular, having agreed with the Australian position on 
West Papua since 1950, saw the capitulation to Indonesian aggression as nothing 
short of appeasement. It had become apparent that Sukarno was threatening the use of 
force from the middle of 1960. On 17 August 1960, following The Hague’s 
announcement that the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman would tour West Papua, 
Sukarno announced that Indonesia was breaking off diplomatic relations with the 
Netherlands.38 It appeared that the increasing infiltration by Indonesia in the territory 
and the Dutch police build-up could lead to an open conflict. Calwell’s position, 
similar to the Government’s was to reaffirm the desirability of self-determination, 
offering up the idea of a: 
mutual regional pact, under the auspices of the United Nations, between 
Australia, Holland, and Indonesia for the purpose of maintaining the peace and 
security of the whole area of Indonesia and New Guinea.39  
This reflected a set of assumptions that would set the tone for Calwell’s handling of 
the dispute between 1960 and 1962.  
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The path of Calwell’s foreign policy had been well developed in Labor tradition 
during Evatt’s tenure as Minister for External Affairs in the Chifley and Curtin 
Governments. Evatt’s outlook and attitudes to the efficacy of multilateral institutions, 
particularly the UN, alongside bilateral security arrangements with the US and to a 
lesser extent Britain, were essential in shaping the Opposition’s approach to the issues 
of the post-war decades.40 Similarly, the wider ideological framework of the post-war 
years, fuelled by horror at the destruction of modern warfare, and the determination to 
develop a world order based upon principles of international and peaceful co-
operation, provided the intellectual foundation for Calwell’s assessments of the 
foreign policy challenges during the 1960s.  
On 13 December 1961, four days after the 1961 Australian Federal election, 
Sukarno established the National Defence Council for the liberation of West Papua.41 
The possibility of imminent conflict drew from Calwell a bitter polemic that 
illustrated his frustration at Sukarno’s unilateral truculence. In a statement to the 
Sydney Morning Herald Calwell opined that ‘The sabre rattling speeches of the 
Indonesian President, Dr. Soekarno, were reminiscent of Hitler’s performances at the 
time of Munich, and just as menacing’.42 By invoking the spectre of Hitler, Calwell 
resorted to a by now familiar pattern of drawing solutions for contemporary policy 
problems from historical lessons. First, in drawing attention to Munich, Calwell was 
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implicitly drawing public attention to Menzies’ history of appeasement.43 Second, and 
of more import than political point scoring, was his contention that Sukarno’s actions 
ignored the UN as the chief mediator in a dispute of this nature, the equivalent of 
which was Hitler’s resignation and contempt for the League of Nations leading up to 
the September 1938 Munich Conference on Czechoslovakia.44 Calwell’s preference 
for a multilateral approach to dispute mediation was further illustrated in an outburst 
that the Prime Minister described as ‘bellicose’ and ‘warmongering’, announcing that:  
If Indonesia seeks to deny the principles of the United Nations Charter and to 
use force to create a potential threat to Australia’s security then I say, with all 
due regard to the gravity of the situation, that the threat must be faced.45  
Leaving aside the ambiguity of how Australia should respond to the threat, Calwell’s 
statement illustrated the primacy of the UN as the appropriate international organ for 
dispute resolution between states.  
Barwick claimed that Labor’s approach ignored the changed composition of the 
United Nations. 46  Arguably, as a result of Menzies’ staggeringly poor manoeuvre in 
1960 and the determination of the Afro-Asian bloc to support anti-colonialist 
initiatives, any Australian referral to the United Nations would have failed. Rather 
than answering the Government criticism, Calwell preferred to delve into Labor 
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history, pointing out Evatt’s successful referral of the original dispute over 
independence to the United Nations in 1949.47 
Recalling Labor’s role in Indonesian independence illustrated the cognitive 
dissonance that shaped Calwell’s approach to West Papua. In 1949 Labor had 
acknowledged the eventuality of Indonesian statehood but this stance was not driven 
by a belief in the principle of self-determination; rather, the Government’s action was 
informed by the fear of the archipelago being ‘lost to a potentially hostile Republican 
Left Wing movement’.48 Furthermore, this recollection fundamentally ignored the 
nature of nationalist movements. Benedict Anderson has used the Indonesian example 
to assert the primacy of imagined communities as the basis for the emerging 
nationalisms of the post-war era, demonstrating that in Indonesia, the ‘boundaries… 
left behind by the last Dutch conquests’ formed a nation where ‘Sumatrans share 
neither mother-tongue, ethnicity, nor religion with the Ambonese’.49 Essentially, 
Indonesia was not ethnoculturally homogenous, and for Calwell to attack Sukarno on 
the grounds that he was abrogating the right of self-determination ignored the 
overriding power of the nationalist construct in Indonesia’s territorial claim. Sukarno, 
though he had never been to West Papua, saw it as part of the extensive archipelago 
that belonged to the multicultural territories that made up Indonesia.50 In a nation 
burdened by the range of problems that beset new states, Sukarno used the myth of 
nationalist revolution to maintain the support of the people, quell the threat of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Calwell,	  CPD,	  H.	  of	  R.,	  29	  March	  1962,	  p. 1152.  	  
48	  Burton	  to	  Officer	  (27	  August	  1948)	  quoted	  in	  David	  McLean,	  ‘Australia	  in	  the	  Cold	  War:	  A	  Historiographical	  Review’,	  The	  International	  History	  Review	  23,	  no.	  2	  (June	  2001),	  p.	  306;	  also	  see	  Margaret	  George,	  Australia	  and	  the	  Indonesian	  Revolution	  (Melbourne:	  MUP,	  1980).	  	  
49	  Benedict	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities	  (London:	  Verso,	  3,	  2006),	  p.	  120.	  	  
50	  Ibid,	  p.	  122.	  	  
	  56	  	  
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and sate the military hierarchy he relied upon for 
power. Failure in West New Guinea would have threatened his doctrine of new 
emerging forces, and consequently, his grip on power. It was proper, but naive to 
hope that the powerful forces of anti-colonialist nationalism could have been 
contained through an activist application of international law.  
The concept of activism has been an article of faith for those who adhere to the 
presence of a discernible Labor foreign policy tradition.51 Arguably, in Calwell’s 
management of the West Papua dispute, there is a distinct trait of foreign policy 
activism. Following his attack on Sukarno, Calwell responded to criticism, asserting 
that ‘Australia has a right to raise its voice in the name of international principle and 
aggression’.52 The issue of Australia’s right to have its voice heard in the councils of 
the world was a recurring theme for Labor, emanating from a deep national 
wellspring that feared the implications of Australia’s geographic isolation. This 
experience, largely drawn from the lessons of World War II, and Labor’s break with 
isolationism, informed Labor’s search not only for security in the form of Alliances, 
but also the complementary development of an independent defence and foreign 
policy to provide for any instance where an ally was unable or unwilling to protect 
Australia’s interests.53  
This commitment to an activist conception of liberal internationalism, driven by 
potent fears of Australian isolationism, placed Calwell’s position on West Papua at 
odds with the American approach. Following the US decision to block Dutch landing 	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and transit rights, Calwell clung to the tenuous belief that ‘Only if… the United States 
consider us expendable, could they refuse to agree with our point of view, and that I 
do not believe they will do for one moment’.54 Laden with the baggage of invasion by 
the otherness of Asia, Calwell painted the difference in assessments of the situation as 
only possible if America thought Australia was expendable. It was a basic 
interpretation of Washington’s policy priorities in the Asia Pacific and the 
ramifications for Australia. In part, his position can perhaps be understood by the 
absence of information coming from the Government on their discussions with 
Washington. However, before the official handover from the UN administration to 
Indonesia, the Americans made it clear to Calwell that his view on West Papua was 
not in convergence with theirs.  
During a brief discussion with President Kennedy in Washington, the subject of 
West Papua was canvassed. Calwell stated that ‘the Labor Party did not like the 
Bunker Plan’.55 Kennedy reflected that the ‘Dutch wanted to do nothing…which 
foreclosed any solution at all, except something along the lines of the Bunker Plan’. It 
was a subtle ticking off by a President who was cognisant that Calwell, given the 
Government’s reduced majority, may become the Prime Minister of their major 
ANZUS partner, at a time when the New Frontiersmen were trying to build a New 
Pacific Community.   
Filling the Void 
With the dispute over West Papua resolved in Djakarta’s favour, Sukarno’s active 
Opposition to colonialism then moved to the creation of the Federation of Malaysia. 	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Symptomatic of the broader international trend towards decolonisation, Malaysia 
illustrated the United Kingdom’s increasing awareness of the impact aggressive anti-
colonial nationalism could have on their worldwide strategic interests. Rather than 
relinquish the benefits of the old imperial framework, former colonial powers 
attempted to retain influence through close economic and military ties.56 Djakarta 
took issue with the creation of the new state, partially because they were not consulted 
and primarily because they saw it as a neo-colonialist creation. For Canberra, 
Confrontation exposed unease that independent action was being increasingly 
curtailed by the departure of Britain and the reluctance of America to fill the void.  
It must be emphasised here that this thesis will not investigate the numerous 
diplomatic and military events from the perspective of the multiple parties to the 
dispute; such an examination has already been conducted comprehensively by both 
J.A.C Mackie and John Subritzky.57 Similarly, though the chronological structure of 
Confrontation shaped the Labor Party’s response, it is not my intention to provide a 
running account of the conflict.58 Rather, Confrontation serves as an instructive case 
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for exploring Labor’s doubts that ANZUS was an adequate arrangement for 
Australia’s security in light of Britain’s retreat from empire during the 1960s.  
On 20 January 1963, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio announced that 
Indonesia would pursue a policy of Konfrontasi against Malaysia.59 The application 
of Sukarno’s radical doctrine of new emerging forces caused concern for Australian 
policymakers who were still digesting the loss of West Papua. Calwell, in an echo of 
his hysterical response to Indonesian aggression in West Papua, attempted to gain a 
political advantage, warning that Indonesia had the capacity to ‘destroy any 
Australian city after giving 24 hours’ notice of its intention’.60 Calwell neither gained 
a domestic political advantage from this approach nor did he seem to have learnt the 
lessons of his first denunciation of Indonesian action. Though this was a public 
statement, it is difficult to reconcile with Labor’s position and may therefore be more 
reflective of Calwell’s personal dislike of Indonesia and Sukarno. This conclusion can 
be drawn because in 1963 Calwell did not have complete control over Labor’s foreign 
policy. After West Papua, the caucus Left, in return for their continuing support, 
extracted the right to consultation and veto in foreign policy matters.61 Given the 
internal divisions over NWC during early 1963, it is understandable that Calwell was 
forced to moderate his views in order to balance a dangerously febrile atmosphere 
within the party.  
Although Calwell briefly addressed support for Malaysia and opposition for 
Confrontation at the July 1963 Federal Conference, the clearest exposition of his 
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thinking on the issue came four months after the 1963 election on 21 April 1964.62 
Outlining his opposition to the Government’s approach, Calwell exposed Labor’s 
central concern that America would not support Australia in the event of an open 
conflict with Indonesia over Malaysia. Calwell’s argument was shaped by three 
concerns:  
First, … that the Government has placed itself in a completely false relationship 
with…Malaysia. Secondly, it is acting on completely obsolete notions of the 
situation of Great Britain. Thirdly, it has a completely false understanding of the 
United States’ role and commitment in the Malaysian Indonesian dispute.63 
These three interconnected issues shaped Labor’s response to Confrontation and, as a 
result, are explored here separately.  
Calwell asserted that Australia’s commitment to Malaysia was based on a ‘vague 
commitment’ to Britain rather than a direct relationship with Malaysia, a situation 
Menzies had admitted in 1963 when he stated that, ‘we’ve not ourselves had direct 
obligations to Malaya. We have come in… on the side of Great Britain’.64 The 
argument advanced by the Government was that due to traditional links with the 
United Kingdom, and because Malaysia was a member of the Commonwealth, 
Australia was obliged to offer assistance.65 Calwell and Labor countered, arguing that 
‘the proper basis for the relationship between Australia and Malaysia is a treaty’, 
whereby Australia could establish an ‘open agreement which sets out precisely our 
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obligations and our responsibilities and – equally importantly – our rights’.66 This call 
for a clear treaty relationship that enshrined rights and responsibilities of the two 
parties illustrated the primacy of international legal arrangements, over tradition or 
cultural relations, in Labor’s approach to foreign policy.  
Moreover, Labor considered the argument that ‘no agreement with Malaysia is 
necessary because Malaysia is a member of the Commonwealth’ fallacious.67 
Fundamentally, Labor was concerned by the precedent set by acting as an appendage 
to British agreements, asserting that Australia was losing ‘real independence of action 
and real control over our own policy’.68 It followed that:  
Nothing could be more dangerous to Australia’s position in Asia, nothing could 
better substantiate Indonesia’s suspicions about our attitude, than that we would 
base the legality of our actions on a British agreement.69 
Importantly, Labor considered a treaty with Malaysia a necessity for two connected 
reasons. First, ill-defined responsibilities running from British arrangements 
reinforced Indonesia’s claim that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist construction and 
second, that Australia’s position sprang from ‘an obsolete view of Britain’s role in 
South East Asia’.70 
The early 1960s was a time of decline for global British influence.71 For Australia, 
Britain’s retreat from empire underlined the necessity of the Alliance as the basis for 
securing Australian regional interests. Labor, though not anti-British, believed the 
Government’s policy on Confrontation rested on flawed assumptions that ‘Britain is, 	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or may be, or can be, or wishes to still be a military power in South Asia’.72 This 
assessment of Britain’s position in South East Asia reflected several distinct trends in 
Labor’s thinking on foreign affairs. Primarily, it illustrated the idea that Australia 
ought to act in its own best interests; especially where relations with new Asian 
neighbours were concerned. Calwell reflected on this thinking, asserting that, 
‘Whatever we do in support of Malaysia, let us do it because it is best for Australia, 
not on any false proposition of what is best for…British power or interest in this 
area’.73 This placed Labor’s position on Confrontation in a broader tradition of 
Labor’s adherence to the need for Australia to determine its own course in issues 
affecting the national interest.  
However, though Calwell publicly argued against any subordination, archival 
research reveals that he was not immune from the national anxiety caused by Britain’s 
retreat from the region. Six months after he laid out Labor’s Opposition to Australia’s 
engagement with Malaysia on the basis of traditional ties to Britain, Calwell wrote to 
Harold Wilson, the new Labor Prime Minister, seeking support for Labor’s policy on 
Malaysia. Calwell wrote:  
It would certainly help us in Australia if I could say that you would favourably 
consider representations from us of the Labor Party to use your good influence 
with the Tunku to negotiate a clear and definite treaty with Australia to cover 
the use of Australian forces for the defence of Malaysia.74 
Though under vastly changed circumstances for Britain and Australia, Calwell’s letter 
illustrated the idea that British support for Labor’s position could shape public 
opinion. Calwell had, to a degree, exposed the sentimentality of Labor’s thinking on 
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Britain, and the residual resonance of British race patriotism in Australian society.75 It 
should be noted that he had served as a minister in the Labor Governments of the 
1940s when both Curtin and Chifley had argued for the maintenance of the ‘British 
Tradition’.76 Furthermore, as Deputy Leader in the 1951 he had supported Evatt’s 
protestations that Britain had not been included in the ANZUS Treaty, as had been 
Labor’s desire throughout the 1940s.77  
Yet, Calwell had evidently not appreciated his own insignificance in the broader 
trend of Britain’s desire to extricate itself from the region. In an echo of Whitehall’s 
private response to Chifley’s concept of the ‘British tradition’, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office in its draft comments to Wilson lamented that the letter from Mr. 
Calwell was ‘slightly embarrassing’.78 Furthermore, Wilson’s response to Calwell, 
that it was ‘entirely a matter for the two Governments concerned’ and  ‘it would be 
quite improper for me to express a view’ illustrated Britain’s desire to rapidly shed 
the outdated trappings of empire in all its forms; while implicitly steering a reluctant 
Australia to the conclusion that it was now on its own. 79 
Calwell’s desire to extract support from Whitehall was exacerbated by his concern 
that ANZUS would not underwrite the deployment of Australian forces in any 
conflict with Indonesia over Malaysia. Coming soon after Washington’s facilitation of 
the Bunker Plan, this betrayed a far deeper fear that as Britain retreated from South 	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East Asia, America would be unwilling to or incapable of supporting a geographically 
isolated Australia in an increasingly tumultuous region. Directly addressing ANZUS 
arrangements, Calwell asserted that ‘It is most important…that America would not 
allow Britain into ANZUS because the United States was not prepared to underwrite 
the stability of the remnants of British colonialism’.80 Moreover, this was not an 
anachronistic reference; Calwell had sought assurances from Averell Harriman (US 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) and US Ambassador Bill Battle that the 
ANZUS Treaty would apply to Australian forces deployed in Malaysia.81 The 
response was that ‘America does not believe that its commitment does include the 
protection of Australian troops already in Malaya’…instead, they would fall ‘within 
the ambit of American policy, namely, the strategic containment of communism’.82 
This mirrored Washington’s public statements of non-involvement in Confrontation, a 
decision most likely taken because of the importance of Indonesia and the escalation 
of American involvement in Indochina.83 It is also plain that the Government had not 
disclosed that Barwick had gained a tacit, though essentially meaningless, agreement 
in October 1963 that ANZUS applied in limited form to Australian forces in 
Malaysia.84  
However, it is likely that Calwell was aware that Whitlam, in a visit to Washington 
in June 1964, did extract a tacit admission along the lines of the Kennedy Barwick 
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Agreement that ANZUS applied to Confrontation.85 It is difficult then to reconcile 
correspondence in the final months of 1965 – after Australia’s commitment to 
Vietnam – between Calwell and Kim E. Beazley that indicates that the ALP still did 
not believe that the US would come to their aid. Beazley questioned whether 
Calwell’s private attempts to ‘get an admission that the United States will not support 
us’ would do anything other than ‘encourage Soekarno to launch a war of 
aggression’.86  Calwell responded that, ‘America will not become involved in the 
defence of our troops…We will be left on our own’. 87Laden with the fear of 
geographic isolation Labor faced considerable difficulty in coming to terms with 
Britain’s retreat from empire and America’s reluctance to fill the void.  
Conclusion 
 The Labor Party’s perspective on West Papua was an important manifestation of 
the party’s commitment to liberal internationalism as the guiding principle of its 
approach to Australia’s relations with the world. While far from an all-encompassing 
dogma, the Opposition’s outlook did provide a flexible and coherent framework for 
how Australia should approach its engagement with regional conflict. However, in his 
polemical attack on Sukarno and, by virtue, Indonesia, Calwell demonstrated a degree 
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of naiveté in his approach to the strategic balance of Australia’s region in the Cold 
War.  
In addition, this chapter has demonstrated how the geopolitical focus on Asia 
during the 1960s created contrasting approaches to the major foreign policy questions 
with which Australia was involved. By investigating American assessments of the 
cold war in Asia, particular the centrality of Indonesia, it is possible to understand 
how the limitations placed on Australian foreign policy by the Alliance shaped the 
views of both the Government and the Opposition.  
This chapter has also highlighted Labor’s desire to pursue an Australian foreign 
policy that might not act in concert with Washington and Whitehall; especially where 
relations with Australia’s new northern neighbourhood was concerned. Moreover, this 
conception of Australia’s place in its region was inextricably linked to the fear that 
Britain’s retreat from empire would leave a strategic void that ANZUS would not fill. 
Critically, Confrontation also informed a profound sense of anxiety and isolation 
during a period when Australia and America committed to the quagmire of Vietnam. 
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- 3 - 
“ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ”: 
Labor, the Alliance and the Indochina Dilemma   
On 29 April 1965, Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies announced the decision to 
commit 800 Australian combat troops to Vietnam.1 This added to a token force of 
military advisors that had been in South Vietnam from 1962.2 In August 1965 the 
military commitment was increased to 1400 men and then in March 1966 to 4500.3 
By October 1967 Australian forces on the ground in Vietnam numbered more than 
8000.4 The Government argued that the decision had been taken to avert the ‘takeover 
of South Vietnam’, which should it occur, represented a ‘direct military threat to 
Australia’.5 Yet, to the Menzies Government, Australia’s commitment was 
inextricably linked to an assessment of the conflict ‘as part of a thrust by Communist 
China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans’.6 
Framed by long-held and incorrect assumptions of Asian nationalism and 
monolithic Communist expansionism, Vietnam reflected both Washington and 
Canberra’s desire to contain Chinese influence in South East Asia.7 Moreover, for 
Australia it exposed the convergence of a profound regional insecurity, borne out of 
geographic isolation, and the correlating determination to ensure the United States 	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  Australian	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  (Sydney:	  New	  Holland	  Publishing,	  2002),	  p.	  vii.	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  War	  (Sydney:	  Harper	  Collins,	  2007),	  pp.	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  –	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5	  Menzies,	  CPD,	  H.	  of	  R.,	  29	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  1965,	  p.	  1062.	  6	  Ibid.	  	  7	  Gregory	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  In	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military engagement in South East Asia.8 As Sexton has revealed, Australia actively 
sought an American escalation and commitment in Vietnam.9 Indeed, Peter Howson 
(Minister for Air between 1965 - 1967) confided to his diary a conversation with Sir 
Paul Hasluck (Minister for External Affairs 1964 to 1969) in which Hasluck remarked 
that Australia’s combat commitment would be a ‘very small insurance policy’ to 
involve the United States in the region.10 
For Labor the Australian commitment in Vietnam was the nadir of both their 
vision for the Alliance and of an independent Australian foreign policy. The Party’s 
deep opposition to Australian and American commitments in Vietnam must be 
understood as a fundamental disagreement over what the conflict was actually about, 
both within the framework of the Cold War and within an Asian context. The ALP 
did not believe Vietnam represented a genuine threat to Australian security because it 
was essentially a civil war being fought using guerilla tactics between a South 
Vietnamese military junta and a fiercely nationalist and Communist North 
Vietnamese regime.11 Similarly, the party saw the policy orthodoxy on Communist 
China as fundamentally flawed: China may have been a subversive and insidious 
political power, but it did not have the resources to offer a military threat to Australia 
in the 1960s. 12 Consequently, Labor believed that the Vietnam conflict should be 
settled through a United Nations peacekeeping mission, a renegotiation of the 1954 
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  1	  –	  6.	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  Howson	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  quoted	  in	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  St	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  Friends	  in	  High	  Places:	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diplomatic	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  University	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  (Melbourne,	  Ringwood,	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Geneva accords, and an increase of economic aid, to ensure the development of robust 
institutions and local economies.13  
The Labor Party’s alternative to a unilateral military solution evinced the strong 
liberal internationalist belief in economic aid and institutional capacity building as the 
basis of Australia’s external affairs.14 This chapter will demonstrate how the liberal 
internationalist tenet shaped Labor’s notion of how Australia should act in concert 
with a rapidly developing Asia. Moreover, this chapter will explore how Labor’s 
opposition to America’s vision for a military solution in Vietnam was not anti 
American, but derived from the view that war in Vietnam was inhibiting America 
from assuming her place as the rightful leader of the free world. Fundamentally, 
Labor’s central problem, was defining how they could oppose American intervention 
and escalation in Vietnam while still maintaining support for the Alliance. 
The conduct of foreign policy is inextricably linked to the intellectual backgrounds 
and approaches of individual politicians and policymakers. As a result, this chapter 
will also highlight the influence that Calwell’s personal perspective on America’s role 
in the world had on the party’s vision for the Alliance. A closer examination of the 
connection between the intellectual approach of Calwell enhances understanding of 
the party’s vision for the Alliance at a time when Prime Minister Harold Holt proudly 
proclaimed that Australia was going ‘all the Way with LBJ’.15  
“We oppose the Government’s decision to send 800 men to fight in Vietnam”. 	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  Sexton,	  War	  for	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  22	  –	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  Internationalism	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  Christopher	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  eds.,	  Evatt	  to	  Evans:	  The	  Labor	  Tradition	  in	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  Foreign	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  (Sydney:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1997),	  p.	  48.	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  Prime	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  Harold	  Holt	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  in	  Washington	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  25	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  1965,	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On 15 September 1953, Gough Whitlam made his first speech on foreign affairs to 
the House of Representatives. Coming midway between the ceasefire in the Korean 
War and the advent of the Geneva Conference that ended the French Indochina War, 
Whitlam remarked that ‘it is to be regretted that the French… have so long denied 
liberty to Indo-China’.16 Paul Hasluck (the Minister for External Affairs during the 
Vietnam War) interjected that the French refusal to relinquish their former colonial 
possessions was ‘part of a world struggle’.17 Whitlam retorted that ‘the quarrel in 
Indo-China is entirely a quarrel between France and its subjects’.18  Hasluck’s 
contention that the situation in Indochina was between Red forces and the defenders 
of liberty may stand as a commentary to and summation of Government attitudes not 
only of the Vietnam conflict but also more broadly of the intellectual framework 
shaping the conduct of Australia’s external affairs until the election of the Whitlam 
Government in 1972.  
In order to understand the American and Australian commitment to Vietnam, it is 
worth briefly revisiting the history of the conflict in Indochina and the ideological 
framework that shaped the decision to escalate the war. Asian nationalism, as has 
been seen in the cases of West New Guinea and Confrontation, posed one of the most 
difficult challenges for United States foreign policies in the twenty five years after 
World War II. America’s early involvement in Indochina adhered to the broad 
framework shaped by Eisenhower’s creation of the Domino Theory.19 Asian 
Communist movements, it was believed, formed part of a monolithic and inherently 
expansionist global phenomenon, with headquarters in Peking and Moscow. The 	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  p.	  27.	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  ‘American	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rapid decolonisation of Asia, and specifically South East Asia, provided fertile ground 
for the development of Communist influence, where there had previously been 
staunchly anti-Communist colonial administrations.20 This assessment, which ignored 
the fact that nationalist movements had no desire to replace colonialism with 
subservience to Peking or Moscow, viewed any perceived regional victory for 
Communism in Asia as a profound weakening of Western influence.21 Following 
Communist success in the Chinese civil war and the cessation of hostilities in Korea, 
it was perceived that another Communist victory, most likely in Indochina, would 
gravely increase the likelihood that the nations south to Australia would face an 
aggressive campaign of territorial expansion from the Communist bloc.22  
At the time of the Labor Split, Vietnam was itself being divided between North 
and South along the seventeenth parallel of latitude.23 The North was controlled under 
the tyranny of the Soviet-educated Ho Chi Minh.24 The South, predominantly 
Buddhist, but with a significant Catholic population, like the North, was suffering 
from the abuses of the French colonial period and was controlled by the weak, 
undemocratic and rabidly anti-communist military dictatorship of Ngo Dinh Diem.25 
However, there were striking continuities between the two Vietnams. Paul Ham has 
reflected that ‘in sum, the methods, if not the ideologies, of North and South Vietnam 
were alarmingly similar’: both regimes used ‘terror, lies, personality cults, 
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  Unwin,	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  27	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  a	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  of	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  to	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  East	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  Andrew	  J.	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  The	  Path	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  York:	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  Vietnam,	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  50	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  assassinated	  on	  1	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  South	  Vietnam	  was	  then	  ruled	  by	  a	  succession	  of	  military	  dictators	  see	  Ibid,	  p.	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propaganda and torture to pursue ends to which they gave different labels.’26 
Ultimately, however, they meant the same thing, ‘a closed, one party dictatorship’.27 
It was into this unstable quagmire that the Americans arrived, just as the French were 
leaving.28  
In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, America’s military presence in Vietnam 
numbered several thousand military advisors.29 Their responsibility was to train the 
South Vietnamese in jungle combat and guerilla warfare, though they gradually 
became involved in active combat against the Vietcong throughout the period.30 
Kennedy, following his election in 1961, set about ensuring the integrity of the 1954 
Geneva accords in the face of increasingly military success for the North Vietnamese-
backed Viet Cong.31 Yet, despite the seemingly enlightened approach of the New 
Frontiersmen in the administration, throughout the Kennedy and Johnson 
presidencies, adherence to the Domino theory was unquestioned.32  
As McLean has noted, the Cold War framework was ‘profoundly flawed’.33 
Orthodox critiques written both during and after the Cold War have tended to treat the 
decisions of policymakers as reasonable responses to the situations brought upon 
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them by circumstance.34 Yet, this assessment of attitudes ignores the intellectual 
framework that governed their actions. In Asia, and particularly for Washington and 
Canberra, policymakers greatly exaggerated the monolithic nature of Chinese and 
Vietnamese Communism, underestimated the nationalist character of Asian 
Communist parties and ignored the limitations of the West’s ability to shape the Asia 
that emerged in the post-war era.35 Partly, this framework can be explained by a range 
of other factors: strategic considerations, economic interest, geography and domestic 
politics. However, the decision to escalate the commitment to Vietnam in the 1960s 
did not flow ineluctably from the convergence of these varying factors. Rather, it was 
the uncritical acceptance of ideological assumptions that confirmed the righteousness 
of entanglement in Indochina.  
 Australian foreign policy in the early 1960s witnessed a watershed in Australia’s 
approach to relations with China. Shaped by the intellectual framework of the Cold 
War, Indonesia’s success in West Papua and Confrontation, the 1961 crisis in Laos, 
Chinese conflict with India and the increasing success of the Viet Cong in South 
Vietnam, Australian policymakers advanced a vision of a hostile China determined to 
achieve Asian hegemony.36 Compounding the rapidity of regional events was a long-
held assumption of Australia’s geographic vulnerability. Consequently, the Domino 
theory – critical in determining US thinking – enhanced Australian fears of an 
aggressive Communist bloc, led by Peking, which would, like the Japanese, 
eventually form designs on Australian territory.37 A month prior to the public decision 
to deploy troops to Vietnam, Hasluck illustrated the primacy of the Domino theory in 	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Canberra’s thinking on the conflict, and the profound need to further involve the 
United States in the conflict, asserting:  
If the United States did withdraw, the same conflict would be renewed 
somewhere else. Within a brief period, the struggle now taking place in South 
Vietnam would be shifted to Thailand. If there was abandonment of Thailand, it 
would shift to Malaysia, to Indonesia, to Burma, to India and further.38  
Everybody knew where ‘further’ was. In this environment the presage of war took on 
an inevitability that was founded on an essentially superficial and incorrect set of 
assumptions about the nature of Chinese power and designs in Asia. The centrality of 
this intellectual framework informed two decisions: first, that it was in Australia’s 
national interest to actively lobby the Americans to commit combat troops in 
Vietnam; second, following the achievement of this objective, that Australia would 
also commit combat troops to the small but existing presence of military advisors in 
Indochina. 39  In practice, even at the height of Australia’s commitment in 1967, the 
military contribution was minimal. Rather, it was representative of political and moral 
support from a key Western ally, at a time when no NATO or European SEATO allies 
were willing to commit to the ill-fated venture; of Washington’s western allies, only 
Australia and New Zealand committed to the cause.  
Midway through the afternoon on 4 May 1965, Arthur Calwell rose in the House 
of Representatives to oppose ‘firmly and completely’ the Government’s decision to 
send troops to Vietnam.40  Yet, his opposition was not simply to the commitment of 
combat troops. It was in effect, a complete repudiation of the intellectual framework 	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determining the conduct of Australian foreign policy. Arguing against the primacy of 
the Domino theory, Calwell accused the Government of adopting a ‘grotesquely over-
simplified position’ that rested on ‘three false assumptions: An erroneous view of the 
nature of the war in Vietnam; a failure to understand the nature of the Communist 
challenge; and a false notion as to the interests of America and her allies’.41 Labor’s 
opposition essentially rested on the divergence in assessments on these three issues. 
First, the view that Vietnam was a civil war, not an extension of Chinese Communist 
imperialism, was central to Labor’s opposition to the war. It was willfully ignorant for 
the Government to propagate the narrative that ‘once the aggressive invaders from the 
North are halted, our men will be engaged in the exercise of picking off the 
Vietcong’, who were ‘stranded from their bases and isolated from their supplies’.42 
The ALP had long been of the view that Australia ‘will be fighting the largely 
indigenous Vietcong in their own home territory’.43  
In addition, Calwell repudiated the Government’s conception of the Communist 
challenge in Asia. The ‘true nature of the threat from China’, Calwell asserted, was 
‘not military invasion but political subversion’.44 He reserved particular scorn for the 
notion that a commitment to Vietnam was in effect halting the onward march of 
Chinese Communism in South East Asia. Calwell contended that the Government, 
having wilfully misrepresented the composition and nationalist character of the 
Vietcong, advanced the theory that because ‘Communist North Vietnam lies north of 
South Vietnam, so Communist China lies north of North Vietnam’ any success for the 
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Vietcong reflected a ‘thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans’.45  
Furthermore, Calwell, reflecting on the strategic obstacles to victory, propounded 
that the Australian and American action would undermine the ability of the West to 
influence the geopolitical positioning of Asian nations. He lamented that the 
‘destruction of the North Vietnamese regime… would create a vacuum that China 
would undoubtedly move into’.46 Australia would have ‘replaced a nationalistic 
communist regime—in a country with a thousand year history of hostility towards 
China—with actual Chinese occupation’ and would either have to ‘accept this disaster 
or face the even greater disaster of all out war with China’.47 This endeavour Calwell, 
and by extension the ALP, believed was ‘the very height of folly and the very depths 
of despair’.48 
Finally, Calwell’s contention that this act betrayed the interests of America and the 
Western allies, including the neutral powers of Asia, requires exploration. Having 
previously deployed the analogy of Munich over West Papua, Calwell retreated from 
the same conclusion over Vietnam, arguing that ‘We talk about the lesson of Munich 
as if we had never learnt a single lesson since 1938. Preoccupied with the fear of a 
military Munich, we have suffered a score of moral Dunkirks’.49 This was both a 
repudiation of the ideological framework governing intervention, and a rather curious 
attempt by a politician of the era to distinguish between the lessons of Munich, and 
the transformation of strategic circumstances in Vietnam. Consequently, Labor was 
unequivocally of the view that a large American military commitment to Vietnam was 	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ultimately destined to fail. They would fail not through outright defeat. Rather, 
‘America could destroy the regime, but it cannot conquer and hold North Vietnam’.50 
Accordingly, Labor believed that ‘humiliation for America could come in one of two 
ways – either by outright defeat, which is unlikely, or by her becoming interminably 
bogged down in the awful morass of this war, as France was for ten years’.51 At the 
core of Calwell and Labor’s conception of the Alliance was the view that American 
idealism and exceptionalism conferred on the United States the responsibility to act 
morally and, where possible, to resolve conflict through negotiation and nation 
building rather than the destruction of war. Labor was emphasizing that Australia as a 
good ally was obliged to help America stay ‘true to its own history as the greatest 
revolutionary power in human history’.52  
However, for Labor, advancing this narrative of an enlightened America 
preserving moral and political goodwill in the developing states of Asia was not easy. 
Pitted against their vision of principled opposition to Communism was the realist 
intellectual framework of the Domino Theory, laden with powerful political narratives 
that stirred long-held fears of isolation and Asiatic invasion in the Australian public. 
In part, this explains the ALP’s earlier response to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the 
catalyst for American escalation in Indochina.  
On Sunday morning, 2 August 1964, President Johnson received news that the 
USS Maddox had repelled an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.53 In 
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response, the United States authorised an air strike that sank the torpedo boats.54 On 
the 7 August 1964, Johnson, who had essentially created a chimera dressed up as fact, 
sought a Congressional Resolution for further military action. 55  It was the closest 
America came to declaring war in Vietnam.56  
From the public recitation of events and certainly from the information the 
Government and the Opposition could glean from American officials, Tonkin 
provided America with casus belli to cross the threshold into open military 
confrontation with North Vietnam.57 Moreover, it voided the need for America to 
seek a SEATO resolution for their actions.58 After the congressional approval for the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Opposition predominantly supported the US action. 
Notably, Whitlam declared in parliament that in the circumstances, ‘It is difficult to 
think that the United States President, or any other head of State, would have reacted 
differently’.59 It is critical to note, that Labor supported US action in Vietnam in 1964 
and in the early months of 1965.60 Indeed, it was not until after the Australian 
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commitment in 1965 that the Labor Party began to actively campaign against any 
military solution to Vietnam. That is, the turning point for the ALP was Washington’s 
decision to escalate the conflict and Australia’s decision to actively support this 
course of action.  
Labor’s early concern was not whether there was a military component to the 
resolution of Vietnam, though if encouraged the US to enter ‘negotiations while she is 
still in a position to influence terms’.61 Rather, it acknowledged the role of a military 
or peacekeeping element to the solution of the conflict, provided it did not entangle 
America and her allies in an unwinnable war.62 Essentially, Labor’s vision for 
America’s role in Asia centred on the notion that by using financial and intellectual 
power, Communism could be repelled through the development of economic 
prosperity and durable socio-political institutions that would support the growth of 
stable Asian states.  
Belief in economic and institutional development as an indispensable tool in the 
conduct of Australia’s external affairs illustrated the primacy of liberal 
internationalism in the intellectual composition of the ALP’s thinking on foreign 
policy. As Lee has noted, the Labor Government of the 1940s evinced a strong 
commitment to ‘laying the foundations for a lasting world peace through international 
economic cooperation to achieve full employment and rising living standards’.63 
Moreover, core economic focus acted in synergy with the establishment of effective 	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social and political institutions capable of supporting developing democratic nation 
states. Calwell was a minister in the Curtin and Chifley Governments and, more 
broadly, the ALP intellectual approach to foreign policy was still shaped by the 
traditions of Evatt and the last Labor Government. Furthermore, while this may 
seemingly contradict the consistency of Labor’s desire to maintain and enhance the 
bilateral Alliance with the United States, they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, as 
the case of Vietnam shows, this tenet of liberal internationalist thought directed 
Labor’s vision for how the Alliance and American power in Asia ought to function.  
As early as 25 September 1963 Calwell was outlining the function that Labor 
ought to play in supporting the US to realise a liberal internationalist solution in 
Indochina. He asserted that the ALP should ‘try to influence American policy by 
supporting those among the American policy-makers who wish the United States to 
seek purposefully a social and economic solution as well as a military one’.64 
On 7 February 1965, the US informed the UN Security Council that it had bombed 
military targets in North Vietnam.65 Despite the escalation towards war, the ALP 
maintained staunch support for proportionate US military action, describing the 
bombing raids as ‘unexceptionable’.66 Yet the bombing did nothing to dampen 
Labor’s belief in the effectiveness of a non-military solution. Adding to the 
international chorus for  ‘a shift…away from the field of battle to the conference 
table’, the ALP again pushed for broader economic and institutional development, 	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stating that the endeavour in Vietnam would fail ‘unless a program of full scale social 
and economic assistance is implemented without delay’.67 This statement of party 
policy was not formally altered until May 1966, a year after the Australian 
commitment of combat troops. Though the May statement was unequivocal in its 
opposition to the war, it still maintained that a ‘Labor Government will be prepared to 
co-operate in the development of the area’, in particular the promotion of ‘individual 
liberty and the rule of law, and… economic well-being and development’. Even as the 
Party’s criticism of the war was reaching a bitter crescendo, they still advanced the 
liberal internationalist tenet of development, now an essential precondition to any 
successful resolution of the war.68 
With the announcement of Australian and US troop commitments in Vietnam, 
Labor’s tacit support for American Vietnam policy altered irrevocably. From 4 May 
1965 until Calwell’s resignation as leader, the ability to manage the domestic political 
repercussions of its Alliance policy declined rapidly, exposing many of the internal 
tensions that had emerged in the early 1960s. Moreover, in their increasingly bitter 
opposition to the war, the purest exposition of the ALP’s vision for the United States 
as the leader of the free world was laid out in full public view.  
“You can liken them to two exactly similar bottles, bearing different labels, and both 
empty”. 
Three months into his Premiership, Harold Holt, perhaps somewhat overwhelmed 
at the lavish reception on his first visit to Washington, infamously pledged to go ‘all 
the way with L.B.J’.69 Few phrases in Australian political history have served to 	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define and simultaneously obscure popular understanding. At one stroke, Holt had 
lashed Australia to the ill-fated American enterprise in Vietnam and subordinated 
Australia’s independence to the United States. That it was a verbatim quote of 
Johnson’s 1964 electoral slogan was forgotten as it accrued an unparalleled symbolic 
status.70 Contrastingly, for Calwell and the ALP, this slogan referenced the nadir of 
Labor’s vision for the Alliance, and Calwell’s personal dismay at the failure of the US 
to realise its rightful role in world affairs.   
The role of a public figure, and especially that of an Opposition leader, is to 
advance an alternate political narrative where there is public discord on a particular 
issue. It is arguably impossible to detach an understanding of the political past from 
the people that formed it. Their responses to the issues and events are fundamentally 
shaped by personal intellectual histories and the broader socio-cultural experiences of 
their life. There is a broad range of factors guiding politicians: personal beliefs, party 
and social traditions, historical interpretation, assessments of broad national and 
international trends, and base electoral strategy. The root of Calwell’s response to 
Vietnam reflects all of these factors and at various levels shaped Labor’s opposition to 
the direction of Australia’s external affairs.  
To further explore the impact of Calwell’s intellectual history on the early debates 
around Vietnam, it is worth briefly exploring the events, ideas and connections that 
shaped his concept of America and its role in the world. Prominently, the Labor 
Government’s wartime experience and the Party’s view of the Alliance as a product 
of that period informed Calwell’s idea of how the US ought to behave as a global 
power. Calwell pinpointed the creation of the Alliance, not in the establishment of 
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ANZUS, but in Curtin’s famous plea for assistance. Calwell, writing his memoirs in 
1972, diminished the increasing intimacy of the Alliance under the conservative 
Governments of the 1950s and 1960s, loaded as it was with his own personal failure 
over Vietnam, and instead reflected on Curtin’s statement as the moment ‘Australia’s 
dependence on Britain…finished forever; Australia was passing into the United 
States’ orbit’.71 Moreover, during the last days of his leadership, Calwell constantly 
referred to this conception of Labor and the Alliance as a retort to the Government’s 
claims that electing Labor would shatter ANZUS, saying that the ‘Alliance was 
founded by the Curtin Labor Government against the bitter hostility of the same 
people whom Mr. Holt represents today’.72 He had good cause to claim that the 
conservatives were being hypocritical by labeling the ALP anti-American. Menzies 
had confided to his diary on his first visit to America that:  
One thing which impresses the mind is that we err if we regard the Americans 
as our blood cousins… they have no consciousness of responsibility for the 
wellbeing or security of the world; no sense of an Imperial destiny.73 
As McLean has noted, ‘Menzies’ views were conditioned by an especially rigid 
Anglophilia’, but conservative attitudes to America were remarkably resilient right up 
until the British decision to retreat East of Suez.74 Yet, it was still the height of 
hypocrisy to harbour private reservations about the legitimacy or readiness for 
American global responsibility and simultaneously condemn the ALP for being anti-
American.  
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Calwell also held a deep personal connection to America through his lineage. His 
paternal grandfather, Davis Calwell, was born in Pennsylvania, and his great 
grandfather, Dan Calwell was an Ulster Presbyterian migrant to the United States.75 
Dan had served for a single term in the Pennsylvania General Assembly (state 
legislature) as a representative for Union County.76 During Calwell’s visit to 
Washington to meet President Kennedy in August 1962, he delayed his return to 
Australia in order to visit Pennsylvania. Following a tour of the Gettysburg Civil War 
battlefield he commented to the local Gettysburg Times that ‘My people come from 
Union County’.77 To Calwell, his American heritage ‘helps to explain my keen 
interest in American history’.78 It had not, however, ‘blinded’ him to ‘the wickedness 
of American intervention in Vietnam’.79 Understanding the private influences on his 
interest in America provides a great deal of clarity for his greatest criticism of 
America’s commitment to Vietnam and his use of American historical references to 
reinforce the ALP’s opposition to the war.   
The national euphoria that greeted President Johnson’s visit to Australia, the first 
visit by an American President, was tempered by the irreconcilable differences over 
the conflict in Vietnam.80 The ill-judged comment of “all the way with LBJ” became 
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a slogan for supporters of the Government and the anti-war camp alike.81 NSW 
Premier Askin’s infamous directive to ‘Run over the bastards’ epitomized the ill 
feeling as televisions across Australia broadcast the horror of the war into every 
lounge-room.82 Calwell, having at first questioned the timing of Johnson’s visit so 
close to the 1966 election, used the opportunity to lambast the President.83 In his 
speech at the official parliamentary luncheon, Calwell welcomed Johnson because he 
led:  
the most powerful nation on earth, the nation that gave to the world its greatest 
revolution; the revolution that gave to the world the Declaration of 
Independence wherein it was stated for the first time that all men are created 
equal and that all men are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable 
rights, including life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.84  
Furthermore he hoped that the President ‘when he goes to Manila’, to discuss peace in 
Vietnam, might ‘succeed in influencing the opinion of that Conference and the 
opinion of mankind so that the day may not be so far distant when all mankind will be 
guaranteed life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’.85 
Calwell reminded Johnson that ‘there was never a President from the 1st to the 36th, 
from Washington to Johnson, who did not have difficulties’.86 Concluding his 
remarks as he had started them, Calwell quoted Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address in its 
entirety. It is difficult to reconcile Calwell’s use of such powerful totems of American 
historical identity. What is evident is that his deep interest in the American 
Revolution and Civil War provided, in his mind, a way to simultaneously flatter 	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America, and caution Johnson for undermining the idealism that all American 
Presidents inherited.  
Moreover, Calwell used the speech as an opportunity to define Labor’s position 
within a framework of American and primarily Democratic Party Opposition to the 
war, asserting that ‘some distinguished Americans, including Senator Fulbright, 
Senator Robert Kennedy, Senator Wayne Morse and others are not prepared to go “all 
the way with L.B.J”.87 The tension in the room was palpable as Calwell continued, 
landing his bitterest barb, speaking directly to Johnson:  
Sir, I have tried to ascertain the difference between the Republican Party and the 
Democratic Party in the United States. I thought they had a bi-partisan approach 
to everything, and convinced that that was so, I read a description of the 
Republican Party and the Democratic Party in the great United States…You can 
liken them to two exactly similar bottles, bearing different labels, and both 
empty.88 
In a disturbingly brutal fashion, Calwell had suggested that both of America’s major 
political parties were essentially devoid of idealism and, with the exception of the 
enlightened few, were disowning the legacy of American revolutionary greatness. It 
was an extraordinary rebuke to a visiting head of state, let alone the President of 
Australia’s last major ally.  
Johnson was incensed at the slight. Not only had Calwell elevated his Northeastern 
liberal opposition, and particularly Robert Kennedy, with whom Johnson had a 
notoriously bitter relationship.89 He had also drawn parallels between the Republican 
Party and the Democratic Party and drawn on some of the most powerful American 
history to reproach Johnson’s actions in Vietnam as a diminution of American 
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exceptionalism.  In his remarks Johnson similarly drew on the history of the 
American Revolution reminding Calwell that there were men in the room who would 
agree with Thomas Paine’s hope that ‘“If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, 
that my child may have peace”’.90 It was a subtle rebuke to Calwell’s inference that 
America’s presence in Vietnam was an abrogation of the principles laid down by 
America’s founding fathers. Johnson hammered home the point, asserting that in 
Vietnam:  
Australians will go all the way, as Americans will go all the way, not a third of 
the way, not a part of the way, not three-fourths of the way, but all the way, 
until liberty and freedom have won.91  
Johnson left Australia. Calwell was left looking, as Donald Horne wryly remarked 
like ‘an old hulk floating out on the tide’.92 Labor’s fortunes for the 1966 election 
were sealed. Their primary vote was reduced to 40 percent and the Holt Government 
was seemingly granted an undeniable mandate for its prosecution of the war.93  
However, though Calwell’s reproach of Johnson reflected the public low point of 
Labor’s Alliance relationship, the greater problem was the gradual erosion of trust at a 
diplomatic level. Since Calwell’s speech in parliament opposing the Australian 
commitment, Edward Clark, Washington’s Ambassador in Canberra, had positioned 
Calwell as following the ‘line of J.F. Cairns…who holds position on Vietnam which 
could be described as almost classically Marxist’.94 In part this was a result of internal 
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divisions within Labor. Tension had been building between Whitlam and Calwell 
over the party’s failure at the 1963 election. It was a division that was evident over 
Vietnam, with Whitlam offering a qualified strategy for withdrawal of conscripts and 
troops from Vietnam, and Calwell asserting that Labor stood for unilateral and 
immediate withdrawal; a position closer to the left than the ‘moderate laborites’.95 
Demoralised by Labor’s 1966 election loss, Calwell reacted bitterly to President 
Johnson’s message of congratulations to Holt, stating ‘As an Australian I resent the 
patronage, the interference and the arrogance with which the message reeks’.96 The 
US Embassy reacted with diplomatic courtesy to this outburst; however, their 
annoyance soon became apparent. In what may stand as a testament to the low level 
to which the ALP and Calwell had sunk in their opposition to Vietnam, Clark, who 
was a close friend of Johnson’s, cabled Washington with the following message:  
CALWELL BELIEVED PRESIDENT WOULD BE WILLING TO DROP 
BOMB AND DESTROY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE 
SINCE ‘HE HAS ALREADY DESTROYED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS 
OF PEOPLE BY DROPPING NAPALM AND PHOSPHORUS BOMBS IN 
VIET-NAM’. THOUGH USG WOULD DROP BOMB ‘IF THERE WERE NO 
ALTERNATIVE’…CALWELL IS SUFFERING HARDENING OF 
ARTERIES WHICH CUTS DOWN ON BLOOD FLOW TO BRAIN AND 
THUS AFFECTS FULL LUCIDITY. SITUATION COMPLICATED BY 
OVERINDULGENCE IN ALCOHOL. PROGNOSIS IS FOR FAIRLY RAPID 
DESCENT TO SENILITY.97  
This quite hysterical treatment of Calwell was unfair, and betrayed some of the casual 
arrogance that typified both Ed Clark’s tenure as Ambassador, and Washington’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  US	  Embassy,	  Canberra	  to	  State	  Department,	  Washington,	  The	  ALP	  and	  Vietnam,	  29	  April	  1966,	  
in RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1964 – 1967, Box 5, NARA.	  
96	  Calwell	  Press	  Release	  on	  Johnson	  Congratulatory	  Message,	  29	  November	  1966,	  Arthur Calwell 
Papers, Folder 1111, Box 257, MS4738, NLA. 
97	  US	  Embassy,	  Canberra	  to	  State	  Department,	  Washington,	  16	  January	  1967,	  in	  RG	  59,	  General	  Records	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  State,	  Box	  1,	  NARA. 	  
	  89	  	  
complacency towards the value of its antipodean ally during the 1960s. Coming 
shortly prior to Calwell’s resignation and Whitlam’s ascension to the leadership, the 
cable also painfully illustrates how the Labor Party’s management of the Alliance 
between 1960 and 1967 mirrored the decline in electoral fortunes. Vietnam, though 
representing the only active opposition of American policy offered by Labor during 
the period, acted as the final nail in Calwell’s political coffin.  
Conclusion 
Framed by the fear and paranoia of the Domino theory, and of monolithic and 
expansionist Chinese Communism, Australia had actively pressured America to make 
a greater contribution to the quagmire of civil war in Vietnam. The Labor Party’s 
opposition faltered by stressing Australia’s sovereign right to have an independent say 
in world affairs and not become entangled in a conflict which was shaped by 
fundamentally false assumptions.  
The essential problem that this created was how Labor could oppose American 
intervention and escalation in Vietnam while still maintaining support for the 
Alliance. Labor’s hope for a peaceful resolution and economic and institutional 
development illustrated the primacy of an idealised liberal internationalism in its 
thinking. 
	  In	  a	  period	  dominated	  by	  fear,	  Calwell	  was	  a	  victim	  of	  principle.	  Moreover,	  his	  fate	  as	  a	  political	  leader,	  shaped	  as	  it	  was	  by	  an	  historic	  and	  idealistic	  concept	  of	  America’s	  role	  in	  the	  world,	  redeems	  him	  in	  the	  face	  of	  overwhelming	  evidence	  that	  Australia’s	  and	  America’s	  commitment	  to	  Vietnam	  did	  nothing	  but	  create	  untold	  suffering.	  Going	  “all	  the	  way	  with	  LBJ”	  weakened	  America’s	  capacity	  to	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influence	  the	  course	  of	  affairs	  in	  South	  East	  Asia,	  and	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  reversing	  Australian	  policy	  intentions	  to	  retain	  the	  security	  of	  Washington	  in	  the	  region.	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– CONCLUSION – 
 
Between 1960 and 1967 Australia increasingly looked to America as the basis for 
securing her position in a tumultuous region. For the ALP and Arthur Calwell, the 
period marked both a nadir in Labor’s electoral fortunes and a marked decline in the 
Party’s belief that ANZUS alone would adequately provide for Australian security. 
This thesis has demonstrated that Labor’s notion of an assertive independent foreign 
policy, which often diverged from the assessments of the United States, was anathema 
in the ‘test of loyalty’ framed by both Canberra and Washington’s flawed 
assumptions of the Cold War and Asian Communism.1 Sitting squarely within a 
discernible Labor foreign policy tradition, Calwell’s approach to foreign affairs 
evinced a tendency to apply the principles of liberal internationalism to the foreign 
policy issues that the Opposition faced throughout the 1960s. An undiminished 
commitment to the United Nations and international law complemented a belief that 
Australia’s relationships in Asia would be better served through economic 
development and assistance in institutional capacity building. However, where this 
tendency departs from the current partisan historiographical construction of Labor 
foreign policy is in its commitment to bilateral relationships with both America and to 
a lesser extent Britain. Despite a continued pattern of conflicting assessments over the 
major regional and international foreign policy issues affecting Australia, Labor did 
not waiver from a commitment to the US as the guarantor of Australia’s security. 
Rather, members of the party often disagreed on how Washington’s policies ought to 
safeguard its role in world affairs, and consequently, Australia’s responsibility as a 
good and true ally.  	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Interestingly, Labor’s ideological divisions and structure often inhibited the Party’s 
capacity to present a unified public face on matters that defined the national debate. 
Though it should not be stressed too much, the left wing, which was increasingly 
prominent in setting Labor’s position on foreign affairs, often advanced a 
comparatively neutralist policy that had the effect of weakening Calwell and 
Whitlam’s attempts to undercut the Government’s misrepresentation of Labor as a 
party that held an anti-American mentality.2 Furthermore, Labor’s attempts to 
prosecute an alternative foreign policy were profoundly affected by an extra-
parliamentary policy structure that may have suited the Party at Federation, but was, 
by the early 1960s, an anachronism that diminished the obligation Calwell had as 
Leader to advance Labor’s position in the electorate.  
The advent of Indonesia’s annexation of West Papua and Calwell’s response to it 
reflected two profoundly important ideas in the development of Labor’s management 
of the Alliance; first, that Calwell in particular and Labor in general were still gripped 
by a fear of invasion and Australia’s geographic isolation; second, that America failed 
to appreciate, or ignored Australia’s nascent fears of again being threatened by the 
otherness of Asia. Similarly, Labor’s response to Confrontation reflected the 
increasing uncertainty that as Britain retreated from empire, America would not fill 
the void.  
The development of Labor’s thinking on the Alliance sheds light on their eventual 
opposition to America’s and Australia’s war in Vietnam. The complexity of the 
Vietnam dilemma is striking. Labor opposed Australian involvement in the war 	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because they believed the commitment was framed by completely false assessments 
of the conflict in Indochina. The Government, which was fixated by the spectre of 
Communist China, actively painted Labor’s opposition as wilfully negligent and anti-
American. However, the argument here is that Labor, and particularly Calwell, 
viewed America’s decision to escalate the conflict in Vietnam as an action that would 
irrevocably harm its moral capacity to fulfil its role as leader of the free world. 
Consequently, Labor’s approach to Vietnam was not anti-American. Rather, by 
propounding a policy that recognised the reality of the situation in Vietnam, Labor 
and Calwell were actively attempting to save America from a decision it would later 
regret.  
The story of an increasingly intimate Alliance relationship during the 1960s has 
received contrasting treatments in the existing historiography. There has been a 
substantial omission of the importance of domestic considerations to the prosecution 
of the Alliance relationship, and consequently the treatment of the Government’s 
decisions that affected Australia’s standing within her region. Critically, as Beazley 
notes, usually ‘A Government is on trial at elections’ whereas Australian politics 
between 1954 and 1966 was curiously marked by an inversion of this tradition and 
instead, existed in a state where ‘the Government is never on trial, the Opposition is’.3 
By exploring the alternative approach offered by Labor, this thesis sheds new light on 
the ideas and considerations shaping Australian foreign policy during the 1960s. 
Similarly, this thesis has illustrated the varying philosophical and intellectual themes 
shaping Labor’s concept of Australia’s place and role in the world.  
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The 1970s, as Meaney notes, ‘marked a watershed in Australia’s relations with the 
world’.4 In 1970 Whitlam triumphantly told parliament that with the abandonment of 
the old shibboleths ‘one of the great tasks for Australian statesmanship would be to 
channel the Australian-American alliance into more fruitful and more constructive 
directions’.5 With the election of the Whitlam Government in 1972 the direction of 
Australian foreign policy became more assertive and far less willing to subordinate 
the national interest to Washington.6 Yet, this new independence had not emerged as 
the ballots were being counted in 1972. Rather, it had been a long and hard road to 
achieving Government and with it, the ability of Australia to act with friendship and 
respect towards a nation with which they shared values, but to which they refused to 
submit to a test of loyalty. As Australia goes into what has been dubbed the ‘Asian 
Century’ it ought to remain aware of the need to assert an independent and respectful 
relationship with Washington that advances its interests within the region. 
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